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ABSTRACT 
Throughout the last two decades, Mexico has experienced important political 
transformations that have affected its economic and social life. The purpose of this 
investigation is to describe, analyze and compare the most important aspects of these changes 
that have occurred in the last three presidential administrations. Included in this study are the 
presidencies of Carlos Salinas (1988-1994), Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) and Vicente Fox 
(2000-2006), and their influence on life in general and the acceptance of democracy in 
Mexico. 
In addition this work is intended to identify the main policies of these three 
presidential terms in Mexico, in order to obtain answers of how Mexico's political, economic 
and social issues have worked in the last eighteen years. Moreover the study will illustrate 
the erosion of the PRI (Revolutionary Institutional Party) as a central political force, and the 
emergence of the PAN (National Action Party) as an ascendant power. The research study 
starts from the Salinas administration, since in the year 1988 Mexico began to experience 
important transformations. In addition the national elections of 1988 were a decisive event in 
twentieth-century Mexican politics. Later on, the study continues with Zedillo's 
administration which might be considered a period of evolution and the most difficult years 
for the country through the PRI domination. Additionally, this work concludes with a look at 
the Fox administration and its impact on Mexican politics and society, emphasizing the 
process that led to shift in the power structure on the national political scene on 2000. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After the year 2003 and the disappointing first three years of the Vicente Fox 
administration, Iwas one of the many Mexicans who wondered what had happened with 
Mexico and the new era of change that we had all anticipated. In this period many Mexicans 
lost interest in the political issues of our country. Proof of that was that in the midterm 
elections of 2003 when only 41 percent of the registered voters participated. In those days 
many Mexicans, including myself, were disillusioned and were looking for an explanation 
and for someone to take responsibility. At that time, I had the opportunity to start an 
interdepartmental Masters in Latin American Studies at Iowa State University. I decided to 
seek answers to these perplexing questions about the Mexican political scene through my 
graduate program and thesis. I felt that an analysis and an evaluation of the last three 
Mexican presidents might shed light on these issues. 
The Revolutionary Institutional Party's (PRI) legacy of political stability and 
economic growth caused modest enthusiasm or appreciation among the Mexican people. The 
contrary occurred, as the growth of an urban middle class produced pressures for political 
reform during the 1980s. Either by legal or fraudulent means, the PRI, time after time, won 
every election at the state and national levels. Just before Carlos Salinas de Gortari's six year 
presidential term, the PRI's devastating dominance over the political system began to 
decrease. The national elections of 1988 were a decisive event in twentieth-century Mexican 
politics. For the first time in its six decades of uninterrupted rule, the PRI found strong 
opposition. In addition, Salinas, who in 1987 became the party's presidential candidate, faced 
hostile protests and bitter divisions within his own party. The young elected president was 
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pressed in the first months of his term to show that he could afford the strong leadership 
expected of a Mexican head of state. However, Salinas was quick to assert his authority. His 
rejection of revolutionary principles was known by the press as (salinast~oika.) These ideas 
would affect political and economic life in Mexico. In addition Salinas succeeded in adopting 
the new strategy to build support for his administration with the creation of PRONASOL 
(National Solidarity Program) and PECE (Pact for Economic Stability and Growth). 
The administration of Salinas achieved a comprehensive structural revolution of the 
Mexican economy. His administration expanded the process of structural modification begun 
by his predecessor, Miguel De la Madrid. Some of the most important basis of Mexico's 
structural adjustment program was the privatization of the country's industries, and the 
liberalization of its foreign trade. Evidently the year 1994 was an important year for the 
Mexican economy; NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) had introduced new 
initiatives for accelerated economic growth and the new neo-liberal economic model seemed 
to have succeeded. Proof of that was that for many Mexicans the idea of reelection was on 
their minds, even knowing that the Mexican constitution prohibits presidential reelection. 
Unfortunately for all Mexicans what seemed to be a promising administration ended in 
disaster. Salinas finished his term of office involved in various controversies. 
By the year 1994, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon became the 62nd president of 
Mexico, thus continuing PRI's political dominance of more than sixty five years. Ernesto 
Zedillo was the first president in Mexican history who obtained the presidency without 
actually seeking it. After Luis Donaldo Colosio's (PRI's presidential candidate) assassination 
there was not another pr~iista (PRI member) able to f~it the technocrat and neo-liberal profile 
and at the same time compete with the strong candidates of the opposition. Pedro Aspe, then 
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Finance Secretary, was an option, but a clause in the constitution stipulates that presidential 
candidates had to be out of government office for six months before Election Day. In order to 
continue his legacy, Salinas appointed Zedillo, then the director of Colosio's campaign, to be 
the next presidential candidate. Zedillo had never been part of an election; all of his previous 
positions had been awarded bureaucratically. Yet, in his campaign he showed enough 
capacity to manage a country which had begun to shake in the middle of political violence 
and a financial crisis. By the end of 1994, the errors in the modification of the exchange rate, 
connected to the millions of dollars invested short-term in the stock exchange, led the 
country toward a devaluation, which generated an exit of capital and that in turn led to the 
break of the Mexican bank system. Indeed President Zedillo faced one of the worst crises of 
Mexican history; however by the beginning of 1996 Mexico seemed to have prevailed in the 
financial crisis that had shaken the country. The evidence of progress was reflected by the 
successful export performance. Increasing foreign trade allowed the Mexican economy to 
penetrate highly competitive international markets. Nonetheless, by far the most remarkable 
aspect of Zedillo's administration was the transition to a democratic model carried out in the 
presidential elections of 2000. These elections were considered the cleanest, most peaceful 
and most open in Mexican history. Certainly President Zedillo stepped aside and accepted the 
electoral victory of an opposition candidate, Vicente Fox. Accepting the victory, President 
Zedillo finished his term of office with the antidemocratic system in place and marked an end 
to the more than seven decades of one party rule. 
By December 2000, Vicente Fox became Mexico's President-Elect, thus completing 
PAN's long struggle to obtain the presidency. However, due to the lack of experience with 
democracy as well as the repercussion of decades of almost dictatorial rule, Fox' 
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administration experienced severe disapproval from critics and the public. Certainly the 
arrival of Fox, a president from a political party other than the PRI, created enormous 
expectations and optimism from a large segment of Mexican society. However these 
expectations have already given way to disappointment, since President Fox's vision was 
little more than the vague promises of change, rather than specific policy objectives. In 
addition Fox's administration has had to confront a contested congress in which his party 
does not has a maj ority, as well as the lack of overall power that once the PRI had used to 
rule. Despite the severe public disapproval due to the wide gap between what was promised 
and what was implemented, the Fox administration was able to carry out significant 
improvements in the health and housing sectors thus addressing two important areas to which 
the federal government in the past had not given sufficient attention. 
The triumph of the PAN in the presidential elections of 2000 would signify a turning 
point in the country's political life. After Vicente Fox's triumph the president was viewed as 
a provisional occupant of a position which can be won or lost at the polls, rather than a 
figurehead. Certainly the lost of the presidential chair by the PRI meant the beginning of a 
new era in Mexico's political life. Indeed Vicente Fox's inauguration was not just a change 
of rule from one party to another, but a profound and dramatic change from the Mexico of 
the past to the Mexico of today. However, Mexico's profound transformation was not 
sufficient to declare that the country had accomplished democratic governance. Mexico is 
still in the process of building its democracy, therefore the country unquestionably 
experiences moments of turbulence which might be reflected in the presidential election of 
2006. 
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CHAPTER I. CARLOS SALINAS DE GORTARI (1988-1994) 
The Technocrat 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari was born on April 3, 1948 in Mexico City. He is the son of 
Margarita de Gortari Carvajal, co-founder of the Mexican Association of Women Economist, 
and Raul Salinas Lozano, a successful politician who was Minister of Commerce (1958-
1964) and later Ambassador to the USSR and Senator of the state of Nuevo Leon. The 
influence of his father was without doubt conclusive for Carlos Salinas devotion to politics. 
In 1967 he became affiliated with the PRI while he studied Economics in the LTNAM 
(National Autonomous University of Mexico). He continued his education at Harvard 
University where he obtained both a Master's Degree in Public Administration in 1973 and 
in Political Economy in 1976, and in 1978 he earned the Ph.D. in Political Economy and 
Government. During this period he taught Public Finance and Fiscal Policies in the ITAM 
(Technological Institute Autonomous of Mexico). Subsequently Salinas begun to work in the 
IEPES (Institute of Political, Economic and Social Studies); one of the goals of such teaching 
was to educate ideologically supportive groups of the PRI designated to take important 
public and political positions in the government (La Botz, 1995). 
Using his successful academic career and his PRI militancy, Salinas held several 
positions in the administration; among them, Analyst in Public Credit and Director of the 
Department of Economic Studies in the General Direction of Tax Office Planning (1976- 
1978), and Co-director and Director (1978-1979) of the same division in the Administrative 
Office of Tax and Public Credit. In 1979 in the six year term of office of President Jose 
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Lopez Portillo, Salinas was named Director of the Economic and Social Policies in the 
Administrative Office of Budgets and Planning (Camp, 1995). 
President Miguel De la Madrid, who was Salinas professor in the LTNAM and one of 
the leaders of the new generation of technocrats, took office in 1982. Salinas, who supervised 
De la Madrid's electoral campaign from IEPES, became Minister of Budgets and Planning. 
President De la Madrid, supported by his right hand man, Salinas, created a new economic 
policy, which initiated a deep reform in the next decade in Mexico. This policy included the 
following: austerity in the budget, privatization of government companies, emphasis on 
foreign investment and reduction in social programs and subsidies (La Botz, 1995). 
In October of 1987 Carlos Salinas was named presidential candidate of the PRI for 
the presidential elections of July 1988. Salinas was chosen personally by Miguel De la 
Madrid and formally by the National Executive Committee (CE1~, thus taking advantage of 
others in the list of p~esidenciables (possible occupants of the presidency), such as the ex-
governor of the State of Mexico, Alfredo Del Mazo, and Manuel Barlett, Minister of 
Government. Carlos Salinas was De la Madrid's Minister of Budget and Planning when the 
President decided that Salinas was best qualified to assume the helm of state (Handelman, 
1997). The selection of Salinas appeared calculated to signal the continuation of De la 
Madrid's austere economic policies, which were largely shaped by Salinas. 
Salinas adopted with a passion one of Mexico's great twentieth century fascinations: 
the search for modernity. For Salinas, modernity would free Mexico from its historical 
sequences of tumult, allowing it to take its place among the organized, prosperous, and 
technologically advanced nations. In addition Salinas believed that the country had to 
dismantle the obsolete paternalist state that had arisen from the Mexican revolution and give 
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markets and independent groups in society the freedom to operate (Preston and Dillon, 
Zoo4~. 
During his administration De la Madrid had publicly promised to carry out political 
reform, a promise that was not realized. De la Madrid's failure to launch the political system 
to genuine competition dashed the expectations of Mexicans both within and outside the 
ruling party. 
The outcome was that some disaffected PRI members led by Porfirio Munoz Ledo, a 
former chairman of the PRI, and Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, former Governor of Michoacan state 
and son of President Cardenas (1934-1940), chose to create the CD (Democratic Current) 
within the PRI in October 1986. The dissidents particularly condemned the practice of the 
dedazo (presidential appointment of the party's next nominee). In addition, CD members and 
their sympathizers also rejected de la Madrid's austere economic policies on nationalistic 
grounds. The president, they believed, had mortgaged the national patrimony to foreigners. 
The CD could not get a receptive audience for its position within the PRI. Disliked by his 
former party members, Cardenas declared himself an independent candidate for President on 
July 1987. Supported by a coalition of leftist parties that named itself the National 
Democratic Front (FDN), Cardenas promoted an eventual return of the ideology of the 
Mexican Revolution. The FDN coalition brought together for the first time several populist 
and leftist political parties and factions that had been notoriously divided in the past. 
Cardenas, attempting to underplay government corruption and attract public attention away 
from governmental authoritarianism, began one of the greatest political campaigns in 
Mexican history (Handelman, 1997). 
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Meanwhile the PAN became a strong force after several years of struggle and by the 
hand of Manuel Clouthier, a vegetable rancher from the state of Sinaloa who had been the 
national president of the Business Coordinating Committee. Clouthier was a charismatic 
political leader who joined the PAN in early 1980s and soon ran for governor of his state. In 
1988, relying on his great charm, he won overwhelmingly the National Action Party 
Convention's nomination for President and undertook a combative campaign against Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari. With these new and strong political forces, Salinas embarked upon his 
campaign having to defend unpopular policies against popular rivals at a time when his 
party's solidarity and influence were in question (Preston and Dillon, 2004). 
Despite Salinas pronouncements mandating electoral probity, the July 1988 elections 
appeared to most observers to be fraudulent. 
The election that brought Carlos Salinas de Gortari to power was clearly fraudulent. 
On July 6, 1988, when the first results began to arrive at the Interior Ministry's Office, a 
shockingly high proportion of the votes were marked for the main opposition candidate, 
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas (Gil, 1992). In a panic move that in the end proved effective, a 
computer glitch was created, one long enough to manipulate results in favor of the 
government candidate. Elections authorities declared that the election computer had 
mysteriously broken down. Post-election reports by outside observers and voter polling 
interviews indicated that much of the rural vote experienced some degree of corruption; the 
FDN and the PAN had insufficient observers to monitor such elections. After much delay, 
the election commission declared Salinas the winner. The surprise was the total number of 
votes for the victor, 50 percent. The low total, which itself smacked of manipulation, 
demonstrated the people's disaffection with the PRI. Later the Congress, which was 
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dominated by the PRI, ordered that the votes be burned to prevent a recount. Many Mexicans 
believe that the real winner of that election was Cardenas (La Botz, 1995). The huge electoral 
fraud of 1988 crushed confidence in the democratic process in the eyes of most Mexicans in 
an era when the organization and counting of the votes were carried out by the same 
government. 
The crisis of the political supremacy of the PRI occurred because of the combination 
of lost chances and a rise of public acceptance for democratic reform. With the election of 
1988 came a new attitude of handling politics in Mexico. Many issues impacted the crisis in 
(PRI) party loyalty followed by the election of President Salinas. This transformation in the 
PRI did not happen all at once, but there was a gradual culmination of miscalculations, 
mishandled policies and an effort by the people to bring democracy to the country. The 
history, management, and longevity of the PRI shows the election of 1988 and its results as a 
part of the country's movement towards democratic reforms ultimately removing the PRI, 
which had been dominant since 1929 (Gil, 1992). 
The 1988 election, in which Carlos Salinas won only half the votes, raised the 
possibility that the party's domination of power might be coming to a conclusion. Things did 
not look good as the new president took office. Along with the country's economic crisis, 
there was a marked decline of public confidence in the PRI. Whereas the percentage of votes 
in presidential elections had been 84 percent for Lopez Mateos in 1970, 92 percent for Lopez 
Portillo in 1976, it declined to 71 percent for De la Madrid in 1982 and barely So percent for 
Salinas in 1988, and that in a palpably fraudulent election (Handelman, 1997). 
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The following table shows Mexico's presidential election results from 1929-1994: 
Table 1 
Presidential Election Results: 1929-1994 
FDD 
Year PRI PAN or PRD Other 
1929 93.55 _ _ 6.45 
1934 98.19 _ _ 1.81 
1940 93.89 _ _ 6.11 
1946 77.9 _ _ 22.1 
1952 74.31 7.82 _ 17.87 
1958 90.43 9.42 _ 0.15 
1964 88.82 11.05 1.03* 
1970 84.13 13.85 2.03* 
1976 92.27 7.63* 
1982 71 15.68 15.89* 
1988 50.74 16.8 32.5 
1994 53.4 28.6 18 
* Total includes anywhere from 1.1 % (1964) to 6.7% (1976) 
cast for "loyal left" parties that supported the PRI candidate. 
Sources: Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, EI estado y los partidos 
politicos en Mexico, 3d ed.(Mexico Ediciones Era, 1986), 132-34; 
Dale Story, The Mexican Ruling Party (New York: Praeger, 1986), 
52; Maria Amparo Casar, the 1994 Mexican Presidential Elections 
(London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1995), 14 and 18; 
CFE and IFE; Ann Craig and Wayne Cornelius, "House Divided: 
Parties and Political Reform in Mexico, " in Building Democratic 
Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, ed. Scott Mainwaring 
and Timothy Scully (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
1995), 258. 
In the ceremony of Salinas inauguration along with eight other Heads of State, 
including Fidel Castro, delegations of FDN and PAN appeared at the Legislative Palace in 
Mexico City. When Salinas entered at the hall, shouts such as "Usurper" and "Salinas : Prove 
your commitment to democracy with deeds" interrupted the triumphant entrance. The event 
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exemplified manipulation by the system, as TV cameras were under state control and did not 
show to the national audience the nonconformist protesters either inside or outside the 
Legislative Palace. All 143 FDN members walked out the hall accompanied by the cries of 
protest from a member, "The FDN does not approve this ceremony." Meanwhile, outside 
shouts such as "Death to the PRI" and "The people voted and Cardenas won" were heard. 
The 50,000 police and soldiers protecting the building fought with activists, injuring an 
estimated 350. While Salinas was delivering his inaugural address, the PAN staged a protest 
march and rally from Downtown to the Southern part of Mexico City (Russell, 1994). 
Salinas promised in his speech economic growth. "Without growth", he said, "There 
is no possibility of justice and of being able to raise our standards of living." "Thus, we have 
to grow again." As well, he pointed to the process of the new economic model, which De la 
Madrid had begun, saying that growth was to be based on non-oil exports and private 
companies, and foreign and domestic trade would be responsible for such growth. Salinas 
referred to the 1988 elections, noting there had been "deficiencies in the official information 
mechanism, which the authorities did not adequately explain in time, leaving some groups 
skeptical about the election results." He promised that under his administration there would 
be "respect for the citizens and demand for plurality and effective participation." After 
Salinas speech, the list of new cabinet members was read in which appeared names such as 
Fernando Gutierrez Barrios, who was named Interior Secretary; Jorge de la Vega, named 
Secretary of Agriculture; Carlos Hank Gonzalez, named Tourism Secretary; Pedro Aspe, 
Finance Secretary; and Ernesto Zedillo, chosen as Secretary of Programming and Budget 
(Russell, 1994). 
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Electoral Reform and Historic Victories of the Opposition 
Carlos Salinas entered the presidency promising political modernization. His election 
with scarcely S 0 percent of the official vote may have meant that the period of the virtual 
one-party system had ended. That bare victory of the PRI also generated a Chamber of 
Deputies in which the PRI gained a surprising small majority. Political parties called for 
honest elections, which meant that government no longer control them. Political reforms 
measures, especially involving electoral issues required opposition legislative support 
(Klesner, 1996). 
As stated in the previous chapter, the opposition launched significant challenges to 
the PRI's hegemony. The PAN created along-term federalist transition strategy intended to 
diminish the power of local and regional governments first, then reduce the role of the 
Congress, and eventually that of the president. There were three main events, which 
converted PAN into a strong political force in the past decades -President Echeverria's 1976 
land expropriation in northwest Mexico, the 1982 bank nationalization ordered by President 
Lopez Portillo, and the economic crisis of the 1980's. The PAN began to make severe 
incursions into the PRI's control in northern Mexico and during De la Madrid's 
administration became a real opponent. However De la Madrid chose fraud instead of opting 
to share power. PRI's antidemocratic stance was evident in several local and state elections. 
After the 1988 elections and the disappointing third place finish of Manuel Clouthier, the 
party continued to emphasize the call for an orderly transition to democracy. PAN demanded 
fair elections and a more equitable share of power between the executive, legislative and 
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judicial branches at federal level, and also between state and municipal governments 
(Russell, 1994). 
In December 1988, PAN launched a policy that emphasized six main points in search 
of an electoral reform: 
(1) changing the makeup of the senate to better reflect the strength of opposition 
parties, (2) prohibiting the practice of forcing trade-union members to join the PRI, 
(3) giving all parties equal representation in elections tribunals, (4) giving agencies 
that organize elections the power to investigate fraud, (5) prohibiting the government 
from giving founds to or supplying workers to the PRI when such support was not 
available to other parties, and (6) including referendum, recall, and initiative in the 
political process (Russell, 1994, p.66). 
On the other side, parties such as PARM (Authentic Party of the Mexican 
Revolution), the PPS (Popular Socialist Party), and the PFCRN (Party of the Cardenista 
Front for National Reconstruction), which eventually formed the alliance FDN led by 
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, emerged from the 1988 presidential election with high hopes. FDN 
members realized that the government was vulnerable and it was time to undertake a struggle 
against Salinas and the whole system. Cardenas decided to form a new political party with 
the features of nationalist-populist inclinations of 1930's and 40's in Latin America. The 
great majority of the left in Mexico, together with a large section of the social leaders, were 
becoming the PRD (Party of Democratic Revolution). Ostensibly PRD was composed of two 
dominating factions, the original left-wing activists who were in strict opposition to the PRI, 
and the disenfranchised PRI leftists who had been rudely deprived of access to power circles. 
The PRD used local conflicts, such as strikes in important national industries, to show its 
support for the activists in challenging the system. The PRD attempted to install its radical 
bases in the country, also using the stagnant economy and the widespread poverty among 
peasants and workers to attract opposition to Salinas government and the sixty years of one-
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party rule. The strong showing of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas left-center coalition and the 
catastrophic economic situation of the country resulted in the creation of a new and powerful 
leftist political force (Russell, 1994). 
Days after PAN's proposals regarding electoral reform, the PRD added to their 
agenda four additional points : "(1) all parties should have an equal role in organizing 
elections and preparing the voter list, (2) a new voter ID with a photo should replace the old 
one without a photo, (3) impartial election tribunals should be created and (4) all parties 
should have equal access to government funding" (Russell, 1994). 
Indeed the legitimacy crisis produced by extensive electoral fraud in 1988 forced the 
President to respond these proposals in a successful manner with the gradual reform of 
election rules, planned in part to reduce the PAN opposition. The initiatives sought to 
recuperate credibility by projecting an image of transparency in electoral institutions, with 
electoral organization changed at every level except the very top (the IFE was formally 
independent of the government; however, it still remained under the control of the Ministry 
of the Interior in which the PRI retained majority representation). Certainly when debate on 
Salinas reforms began, political parties, civil society leaders, and intellectuals accepted the 
reforms as a step in the direction of democracy. Yet, others pointed out the reforms, serious 
limitations. In effect, the debate was over what degree of electoral transparency is needed in 
order for a democratic system to work (Middlebrook, 2004). 
Salinas succeeded in enlisting the PAN's support for constitutional amendments 
intended to eliminate opportunities for fraud in registration and voting procedures. During 
1989 and 1990 the Congress approved several amendments to the constitution and to the 
COFIPE (Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures). One of the main changes of 
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this law was the creation of the IFE (Federal Electoral Institute), which replaced the 
administrative office in charge of the organization and supervision of the electoral processes 
at federal, state, and local levels. The IFE included the introduction of majority nonpartisan 
representation in the governing board and a legal framework for Mexican and foreign 
observers to monitor the elections. In addition Salinas implemented the vote register list and 
the creation of a new voter ID, and he established the TFE (Federal Electoral Tribunal), 
whose main function was to punish the violators of the electoral law (Russell, 1994). 
The Salinas reform left the size and composition of the Chamber of Deputies (300 
relative majority seats and 200 proportional representation seats) unaffected. Yet the formula 
used to give proportional representation seats was modified to favor the majority party. 
Under the terms of the legislation's so-called governable clause, the prevalent party in the 
Chamber of Deputies would hold seats disproportionate to its electoral strength up until it 
controlled sixty percent of the seats in the Chamber. In addition in 1993 the number of 
senators was increased from three to four per state, of which a fourth of them represented a 
minority party in each state, thus reducing the representation of the ruling party 
(Middlebrook, 2004). 
In the hands of the PAN, the PRI lost its first state in Ju1y1989 in Baja California 
North. On that day there were elections for governor, four mayors and fifteen state legislative 
seats. After a rigorous campaign, Ernesto Ruffo, ex-major of Ensenada, defeated Margarita 
Ortega, who Salinas had chosen and given massive federal support. On June 1989, Ortega 
traveled to Mexico City and met with Salinas. On her return she announced the acquisition of 
16 million pesos from the federal government to address economic and social problems in the 
state, but with the message that such problems would only be forthcoming if the PRI 
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candidate were elected. The PRI announced that Ortega's campaign cost $1.2 million, but 
unofficial estimates placed the cost between $ 8 million and $40 million. PAN created a 
massive security machine in order to ensure a fair election. Pro-PAN citizens guarded the 
polls to prevent the government from stealing the election as it had done in the past. As the 
votes were being counted, President Salinas ordered PRI officials not to engage in electoral 
alchemy, thus ensuring a fair vote count (Russell, 1994). 
Indeed, Salinas administration recognized the triumph of the PAN candidate for 
governor in Baja California North, thus achieving a significant break with the past, since 
Ernesto Ruffo was the first opposition governor in sixty years. However, given the small 
ideological distance between Salinas and the PAN, and the possibility of a mutual benefits, 
few were convinced that this election represented a solid democratic achievement (Centeno, 
1994). 
In 1991 the PRI electoral triumph in the gubernatorial elections in Guanajuato and 
San Luis Potosi ignited accusations of fraud. In both cases, Salinas intervened by forcing the 
local PRI candidate to resign. In San Luis Potosi a different PRI leader was established as 
interim governor and in Guanajuato the interim governorship was handed to a PAN member. 
By compelling the PRI candidates to withdraw, Salinas recognized the demand for 
democracy made vocal by citizens in Guanajuato and San Luis Potosi. Yet, by imposing 
alternatives to the PRI candidates, Salinas strengthened the role of the presidency (Otero, 
1996). 
In the first two years under the Salinas administration, there was a lack of head-to-
head political competition in many localities. The Oaxaca municipal election was an example 
of that, as the PRI was the only party with a candidate in the large number of municipalities. 
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In 1990, 3 81 mayors and 110 state legislators were directly elected in the country, all of them 
of the PRI, which faced no opposition. An important aspect of the elections under Salinas 
administration was that every election produced fraud charges, thus creating the doubt over 
whether Mexico was really democratic (Russell, 1994). 
The 1992 gubernatorial elections in Chihuahua and Michoacan illustrated the Salinas 
administration cautious approach to the opposition in general. In Chihuahua the PAN 
candidate was the victor and was acceptable to take office, however, in Michoacan the PR.D 
victory over the PRI was not accepted by Salinas administration. The results of the state 
elections seemed to confirm the pattern: some democracy, fraud in many cases, and 
continued imposition of decisions from above (Centeno, 1994). 
The PRD protested over the official results after many days of public protest capped 
by a massive disapproval march. In addition peasants, workers, and students occupied several 
government municipal offices. State violence resulted in the deaths of six people. As a result 
Salinas was finally forced to intervene and change the sitting governor for another PRI 
substitute. Even though President Salinas rejection of evident electoral fraud was by no 
means original, his warning concerning fraud in state and local elections helped to reduce 
some prominent abuses (Cockcroft, 1998). 
The dramatic erosion of the PRI from the previous election in 1988 surrendered an 
unprecedented 50.4 percent of seats in the Chamber of Deputies. However, in the 1991 
Mexican mid-term elections Salinas did succeed in building popularity and strengthening the 
PRI's vote getting at 61.4 percent of seats in the Chamber of Deputies (Handelman, 1997). 
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The following table shows Mexico's Chamber of Deputies election results from 
1964-1994: 
Table 2 
Elections for the Chamber of Deputies: 1964-1994 
(Percentage of the Valid Vote) 
Independent 
Year PRI Left Loyal Left PAN 
1964 86.3 _ 2.1 11.5 
1967 83.8 _ 3.6 12.5 
1970 83.6 _ 2.2 14.2 
1973 77.4 _ 5.8 16.5 
1976 85.2 _ 5.6 8.9 
1979 74.2 5 5 11.4 
1982 69.3 5.6 5 17.5 
1985 68.2 4.5 6.1 16.3 
1988 50.4 29.6 _ 18 
1991 61.4 8.9 8.3 17.7 
1994 50.3 16.7 2.7 26.8 
The 1994 totals, unlike the others, includes annulled votes. The party 
totals, therefore, add up to only 96.5% and are not comparable to those 
of oher years. 
Sources: Federal Electoral Commission and Federal Electoral Institute 
(1976-91); Federal Election Institute (1994); 1964-88 data aggregated 
in Kathleen Maria Bruhn, "Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New 
Cardenista Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico, ("Ph. D. diss., 
Stanford University, 1993), 3.;Joseph L.Klesner, "Realignment or Dealign-
ment, " in The Politics of Economic Restructuring, ed. Maria Lorena Cook 
Kevin J. Middlebrook, and Juan Molinar Horcasitas (La Jolla: Center for 
U.S. -Mexican Studies, University of California-San Diego, 1994), 162; 
German Perez Fernandez del Castillo et al., La voz de los votos: Un 
analisis cr i tico de las elecciones de 1994 (M exico; FLACSO, 1995), 259. 
The massive public works and welfare program, PRONASOL and the PECE, 
manifested the new strategy implemented by Salinas to build support for his administration. 
In addition, while many foreign observers graded the elections as relatively clean, domestic 
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observers and participants knew otherwise. A close examination of the election shows that 
fraud, intimidation and rigged procedures were as widespread as ever. 
PRONASOL and PECE 
After electoral reform, PRONASOL, a "pork barrel program" which was created to 
give financial relief to Mexico's poor while ingratiating the new administration to the 
recipients, became the first component of Salinas development strategy. PRONASOL 
quickly made possible a maj or new foundation of presidential power. The new anti-poverty 
organization served simultaneously to diminish Salinas dependence on the traditional party 
hierarchy and to build his political support in low-income urban slums and rural Mexico. 
Eventually, it also became a tool through which the presidential elite were required to recruit 
new local political leaders who led the reform of the PRI itself. PRONASOL, which raised 
several million dollars from private funds, intended to deliver public works projects to poor 
areas in the country. Heavy government spending on social projects (schools, health clinics, 
and roads, among others) created an image of solidarity of an extension of civil society. 
Salinas declared that PRONASOL would approach and aid those who lived in need and 
especially to those mired in extreme poverty. Therefore, the program would reach almost half 
of the population. In addition, Salinas stated that PRONASOL would lead a campaign for 
justice and democracy, and he rejected the accusations of opposing parties that had accused 
the program of having populist and paternalist tendencies (Otero, 1996). 
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In late 1989, PRONASOL summoned leftist organizations and their communities and 
peasant groups to allow them to keep their own local organizations and to receive 
PRONASOL funds. At first Salinas put technocrats in the control, but he later decided that 
leftists would administer the program. Carlos Tello, a nationalist and social democrat, was 
named the first coordinator. He was followed by Rolando Cordera, a former member of the 
PSUM (Mexican Unified Socialist Party), which was one of the Mexican radical parties. 
Salinas knew that through the leftists, PRONASOL would be able to make connections to 
many organizations that had appeared after the earthquake in 1985 (It was at this time that 
the Mexican people organized volunteer rescue units and engaged in reconstruction efforts, 
while the government itself was ineffective in this effort) and which considered themselves 
as part of "civil societies". Soon after, Salinas succeeded in capturing the support of many of 
these groups through PRONASOL (La Botz, 1995). 
Indeed, President Salinas was able to reconstruct the patronage machine of the PRI 
with PRONASOL. The Salinas administration was able to maintain its control over popular 
challenges and at the same time respond to strategic needs while imposing several costs. 
PRONASOL served to provide the states with the political space required to marginalize the 
opposition while the regime underwent its restructuring. Besides setting up political control, 
PRONASOL was the key to the success of the technocrats in Mexico, since Salinas began to 
build a new political structure in order to replace the old one. The new program embraced a 
budget of 1.7 billion dollars during 1991 besides controlling an unquantifiable percentage of 
the budgets of other agencies. The flow of funds and the political power was so great that the 
provincial directors of the program were called "vice-governors" (Centeno, 1994). 
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PRONASOL was the classic example of the PRI strategy in which opposition and 
other political discontent could be co-opted through patronage. PRI presidents had used 
similar populist procedures like PRONASOL; yet Salinas new program was different in three 
important aspects : 1) the president controlled the program directly (there were no mediating 
organizations between beneficiaries and the president), 2) the program encouraged local 
participation in the design and management of the projects (increasing efficiency and 
generating enormous political support), and, 3) it avoided extensive coverage through 
subsidies and emphasized assistance to the "truly needy." In addition Salinas distributed 
PRONASOL's projects in the areas where the opposition posed the greatest threat in the 
elections of 1988 in which Cuauhtemoc Cardenas seemed to have won. As a result 
PRONASOL appeared to diffuse much of the grass-roots opposition raised in the past 
presidential election. It is important to mention that during 1988, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas had 
succeeded in uniting the isolated local movements into a national opposition; nevertheless, 
PRONASOL was successful one more time in isolating these into individual bodies that 
could be more easily won over. The result was an electoral victory in the midterm elections 
of 1991 (for Salinas) in which PRI showed an extraordinary recovery by obtaining a majority 
in Congress. However, that victory was more of an achievement for President Salinas and 
PRONASOL than for the PRI. As a final point, Salinas administration was able to assure 
through PRONASOL political stability (out of popular pressures) and protection from the 
consequences of its own actions derived from the establishment of a neo-liberal model 
(Centeno, 1994). 
The second developmental initiative of Salinas administration was the creation of the 
PECE, crafted by Salinas and which revised athree-party accord, which signaled that 
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inflation was being brought under control and simultaneously had come to serve as a 
stimulus to the Mexican economy. By the end of De la Madrid's administration a program 
was eventually created under the name of Economic Solidarity Pact. Labor, business and 
commercial farmers agreed to wage controls as well as controls on many consumer supplies 
as part of an economic recovery plan. However, it was not until the Salinas administration 
modified program that it began to give results, since inflation was reduced substantially and 
economic growth became evident. Indeed during the first three years of the Salinas rule the 
economy grew for the first time since the oil boom in the late 1970s (Handelman, 1997). 
The program emphasized the government's commitment to economic growth without 
sacrificing price stability. Growth was hindered by the enormous negative transfer of 
domestic resources since the crisis in early 1980s. During 1989 all prices were regulated 
through the PECE; since then, this regulation by agreement was relaxed in 1990 and even 
more in 1991. With some exceptions, the government lifted price controls on many products 
and made price setting more flexible. Consequently it shortened the list of price controlled 
items and reduced the differentials among controlled domestic prices and international prices 
(Lustig, 1998). 
The PECE was a mixed program emphasizing traditional and market driven 
mechanisms and perfectly reflected the particular structures and apparent contradictions of 
Mexico's technocrat rule. The program contained on the one hand tighter government 
spending, greater efforts at increasing revenues and monetary and credit controls; and on the 
other hand a wage and price freeze meant to reduce inflation. Thus it demonstrated that the 
technocrats in Mexico were not "generic neo-liberals" who applied monetarist policies 
arbitrarily but showed that they were willing to develop mechanisms with the intention of 
23 
managing the economy. More than the implementation of contradictory policies, which in 
fact had characterized the PECE, was the willingness and ability of the regime to control 
various social actors. Yet, the PECE succeeded because of the enforced cooperation of 
private industry. When the government did not receive the required cooperation from 
producer and retailers, it threatened major business leaders with sanctions, audits, and loss of 
government contracts (Centeno, 1994). 
The PECE had gone through fifteen negotiations since its implementation in 1987 
during De la Madrid's administration. The negotiations of the program began as very short-
term commitments lasting two months, and soon after they grew to longer one year 
commitments. During the first period of negotiations the Mexican government opted to 
emphasize price and wage controls, fiscal and macroeconomic adjustment, and debt 
renegotiation. However, in the later negotiations, the government focused on deregulation 
and privatization to promote economic efficiency and on trade and financial liberalization to 
improve competition and establish a reduction of costs. Unquestionably price and wage 
controls remained the most controversial element of the program, since price controls were 
not uniform across the economy and wage controls included programs that basically limited 
nominal increases. Some analysts believed that the price and wage controls policy was 
necessary to reduce inflation. Others, however, considered the measure unnecessary, since 
without fiscal and monetary austerity, the lifting of the price controls would just result in a 
return to elevated inflation. Thus, the price and wage controls policy was much debated 
during the first years of the Salinas administration (Gould, 1996). 
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The Crack of the Ejido Myth and the State Recognition of the Church 
Drought and inefficiency had so severely damaged agriculture that El Campo (the 
rural area) became one of the most urgent issues that President Salinas had to address. The 
situation of Mexican agriculture was so desperate that some experts considered the situation 
impossible to change in only one presidential term. In addition the agricultural sector 
continued to lag far behind the rest of the economy. 
Due to the Agrarian Reform carried out in the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) more 
than three million peasant families had received land, which under the ejido system was 
distributed by the government to peasant farmers. In this program the parceled land is 
reciprocally controlled by the government and by its recipient, and its tenure and sale remain 
regulated by the state. The intense struggle in the Revolution and the eventual recovery of 
control of that property by the peasants had made a change in land policy seem unlikely at 
this stage. In order to prevent the ejidata~ios, the peasant land recipients, from selling their 
land to richer farmers, the ejido law prohibited the sale or transfer of land to outsiders. 
Indeed, one of the greatest achievements of the Mexican Revolution was the Agrarian 
Reform, thus making the altering the of ejido system unthinkable. However, not all the 
communally controlled ejido land was useful and peasants were dependent on the state for 
credit, technical assistance and irrigation. Besides, fertile land had been divided into family 
plots, which were controlled by caciques, the term originally meaning village chief but 
having evolved to mean local political boss. Many critics believed that the Salinas 
administration needed to reduce the exploitation by government agencies, such as the 
business done by BANRUR.AL (National Bank of Rural Credit), the main agricultural credit 
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bank, and to expand the state's aid to be received more directly by the peasants. However the 
Salinas market-oriented policy makers did not agree that peasants could become competitive 
and thus opposed significant spending to assist them (Handelman, 1997). 
In 1992 the purpose of governmental policy was to permit the privatization of 
inalienable community ejido land. To promote this effort, the Mexican congress passed a 
new ejido law amending Article 27 of the constitution. The congress formally ended the 
original ejido system, one of the Revolution's most respected triumphs, which had 
determined that the government had an obligation to redistribute land to the peasant 
population. The change in policy meant that ejidata~ios had to rent or sell their plots or could 
also use them as a guarantee for loans. In addition, peasant land owners became part of the 
business enterprise with outsiders including foreigners, which were allowed to own up to 49 
percent of the farms. The decision of the Salinas administration to alter the constitution was 
supported by the speculation for the possibility of increasing production for the domestic and 
export markets. However, ejido farms have not attracted big interest from Mexican or foreign 
investors, so the immediate impact of the law has been limited and the future vision of ejido 
farming does not seem promising (Harvey, 1996). 
Mexico's entry into NAFTA represents another important concern for many peasants. 
They are, with outdated farming practices and limited technology, hardly ever able to 
compete with high-tech agricultural practices used by growers in the United States. Since 
American farmers produce four times as much corn per acre as Mexicans producers do, the 
exclusion of trade protection means that it is generally cheaper for the Mexican market to 
import corn from the U.S. than to grow it. However, the Salinas neo-liberal model, which 
seemed to ignore the reality of Mexican farming practices, believed that peasants would be a 
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key part of the production of higher value crops than those agricultural products that could be 
exported (Handelman, 1997). 
The Salinas agriculture policy was designed to modernize and improve efficiency of 
the rural areas of Mexico, although it was a failed plan regarding its intent to rescue one of 
Mexico's main industries. In the Salinas administration the national agriculture plan has only 
created more problems and the farmers have abandoned their land and turned to immigration 
to the North as an option to avoid economic misery. 
Another important issue addressed by the Salinas administration was to give legal 
status to the Catholic Church, which had not previously been recognized by the Mexican 
government, as well as to see that relations with the Vatican be re-established. The 
anticlerical laws that were created in the middle of the nineteenth century eliminated the 
economic, political and cultural power of the Catholic authorities. Such laws were considered 
among the great achievements of the Mexican liberals who sought to separate the Church and 
the State, releasing the Church from an absolute dependence. Later during the revolution, 
revolutionary governments accentuated the already promulgated laws passed by the liberals 
through the 1917 Constitution in which the State made clear a refusal to recognize the 
juridical status of the Church (Puente, 1996). 
However, in spite of the laws that reduced its power, the Church in Mexico 
accumulated vast holdings of property, conducted religious education and sent its priests and 
nuns into the streets in their clerical dress to proselytize and manipulate the population and 
government. Catholic influence was an essential element in any sphere of the Mexican 
society in which 97 percent of the population identified themselves as Roman Catholic. 
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Indeed the Church in Mexico sought and achieved an overwhelming hold on popular 
awareness (Krooth, 1995). 
Church-State relations became obscenely harmonious especially after 1960, since 
both Church and State propagandized against communism and terrorism. In addition, private 
catholic education increased and supported a mounted campaign to defend the virtues of 
motherhood and family life. Church and state also rejected radical proposals from leftist and 
feminist groups for the legalization of abortion. Nevertheless by the early 1980s a group of 
revolutionary clerics who practiced Liberation Theology (a preferential option for the poor in 
which the Church should be involved in the struggle for economic and political justice) 
emerged. As a result an important number of socially devoted priests and nuns worked 
alongside progressive organizations of workers, peasants and students, among others, to 
provide assistance to the poor and to organize politically for social justice. Yet, in order to 
diminish right-wing opposition and gain support for his conservative neo-liberal economic 
policies, Salinas removed the anticlericalism clauses in the constitution with the purpose of 
making the constitutional amendments effective; thus the Law of Religious Associations and 
Public Work was created. The Salinas administration had restored the legal status of the 
Catholic Church, opening a new era in Mexico in Church-State relations (Cockcroft, 1998). 
Indeed as part of his inaugural speech in 1988, Salinas announced the necessity of 
modernizing Church-State relations. In the same year the Mexican bishopric requested 
President Salinas to amend the several constitutional articles (article 3: concerning education 
by the church; article 27: ability to acquire property; article 24: religious manifestations of 
the people; and article 13 0 : political manifestations of the clergy) that restricted the Church 
and the rights of its parishioners. Then arouse a series of encounters among the government 
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and representatives of the Church led by the then apostolic delegate Geronimo Prigione. 
Consequently Salinas announced a series of initiatives sent to the Congress that would 
reform the constitution. Undeniably, the Salinas declaration was a surprise, since two years 
before, during De la Madrid's administration, the agreement was denied due to a church-
politic polemic after the declarations of some bishops accusing electoral frauds by the PRI in 
the 1985 and 1986 elections (Puente, 1996). 
Certainly President Salinas was seeking the political advantages of Church backing to 
carry out his programs based on popular compliance, not caring that these reforms would 
dissolve one of the revolution's victories. Thus by 1992 the conservative PRI-controlled 
congress approved without problem the Salinas initiatives: the Church then obtained legal 
status as well as the right to own property and to conduct religious education. Consequently 
the Church, now cleared of impediments, activated its resources pressing the population into 
its catechism and calling on Catholics to value the family; priests and nuns now openly 
proselytized in public in clerical dress (Krooth, 1995). 
In addition, the new laws gave clergy the right to vote and access to television, and 
their churches were empowered to run their own schools without state interference. 
Consequently Mexico completely restored diplomatic relations with the Vatican. As a result 
the Papal Nuncio (the apostolic delegate Geronimo Prigione who increased his power after 
the Constitutional modifications and obtained the rank of Nuncio) led a complete offensive 
against members of the clergy who favored Liberation Theology. In fact the Papal Nuncio 
made public a scheduled transfer back to the Vatican of Samuel Ruiz, Bishop of San 
Cristobal de las Casas Chiapas, who several times had denounced injustice and daily 
violations of human rights in the region and later was accused of being part in the EZLN 
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(Zapatista National Liberation Army) uprising (armed guerrilla movement that broke out in 
the state of Chiapas in 1994 fought mostly by indigenous of the region). However the Indian 
rebellion put Bishop Ruiz at the center stage of Mexico's peace process, since many Indians 
in Chiapas identified with him, and thus left the Papal Nuncio with temporarily diminished 
influence (Cockcroft, 1998). 
According to some analysts, Salinas recognition of the Church as a legal entity was 
seen as modernization, whereas for others it was seen as a historic regression. In reality the 
policies carried out by Salinas regarding the Church were controversial. Nevertheless, while 
there were negative reactions by those who had considered anticlerical postures as a historic 
advance, a large number of Mexicans believed that it was time to modify the constitution and 
bring it up to date in order to transform Mexico into a modern state (Puente, 1996). 
NAFTA and Privatization 
During the 1980s, Mexico's new neo-liberal development policy approved a change 
in foreign policy. Both De la Madrid's and Salinas administrations neglected the country's 
ISI (Import Substituting Industrialization) model, which was created in Latin America and 
built on import substitution and protectionism. For decades, ISI had driven economic growth 
resulting in rising living standards; however, it had also initiated programs that resulted in 
massive trade and budget deficits. In 1986, Mexico entered into the GATT (General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), which had been created after World War II in order to 
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reduce tariffs, thus facilitating trade between the world's capitalist nations. For many years, 
Mexico avoided the agreement because of protectionism and the common sense of its ISI 
model. However, the admission of Mexico into GATT meant the opening of the country's 
economy to the world and constituted the first step to create links with the economies of the 
United States and Canada, in order to become associates with NAFTA (Handelman, 1997). 
Salinas supported the creation of NAFTA with the intention of totally integrating the 
Mexican and U. S . economies and reinforcing Mexico's capacity to compete in the world 
market. Under the agreement, Mexicans have gained greater access to imports from the U. S ., 
and at the same time Mexican companies can sell more easily in the North American market. 
NAFTA reassured Mexican businessman and foreign investors, burned by the preceding 
government's economic policy, that the transition to an open economy was irreversible apart 
from who might succeed Salinas (Handelman, 1997). 
On June 12, 1991, U. S ., Canadian and Mexican delegates met in Toronto to start 
negotiations, on six main issues: 1) Market access, 2) Foreign investment, 3) Intellectual 
property rights, 4) Service, 5) Dispute settlement mechanism, 6) Subsidies and dumping. In 
August 1992 after successful negotiations with anti-NAFTA groups, the dialogue concluded 
with a document of more than 1,100 pages. In that instance President Bush declared: "Today 
marks the beginning of a new era on our continent, on the North American continent." Three 
months later in San Antonio Texas, Presidents Bush and Salinas and the Prime Minister of 
Canada, Brian Mulroney, initialed the full text of NAFTA. Consequently Mulroney stated, 
"While geography and the forces of history have made us neighbors, this agreement will 
make us partners -partners in opportunity and partners in the economic success that follows 
from free and fair trade" (Russell, 1994). 
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On December 17, 1992 these three heads of state signed the full text of the agreement 
in their respective capitals. The result was a market population of 369 million: 27 million 
from Canada, 86 million from Mexico, and 256 million from U.S.; and a gross domestic 
product of $6.91 S trillion: $317 billion from Mexico, $598 billion from Canada, and $6 
trillion from U.S. The agreement provides that tariffs will be progressively reduced to zero 
over aten-year period and at the same time quotas will be eliminated over 15 years. NAFTA 
controls tariffs, non-tariff barriers and investment. In other words, those goods that come 
from the other two nations must be treated like goods produced domestically. Each country 
in NAFTA exempted certain activities from the agreement: for example, the U.S. does not 
allow the free movement of people, except for specialists, thus reflecting U. S fears 
concerning the possibility of an immense exodus of poor people from Mexico to the U.S. On 
the other hand the Mexican government exempted its main industries from NAFTA: 
railroads, electricity, basic petrochemicals and oil, thus retaining its right to control them 
(Russell, 1994). 
Agricultural imports have received special treatment. All agricultural quotas and 
numerous restrictions were eliminated as soon as NAFTA took effect. However, as the 
NAFTA votes in the U.S. Congress moved toward approval, the Clinton administration 
gained additional support in order to provide some protections to specific crops. Mexican 
negotiators conceded to them, even though these agreements violated NAFTA's spirit 
(Handelman, 1997). 
In Mexico, once Salinas decided to generate a free trade agreement among Mexico, 
U.S. and Canada, the PRI congressional delegation and cabinet members fell in behind 
NAFTA, the same group who in 1989 had stated that free trade dogma was inappropriate due 
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to the economic differences among countries. Now they were resolutely defending it after the 
1990 policy switch, thus showing one more time the influence of presidential power. The 
CTM (Mexican Confederation of Workers), which is one of the country's most important 
labor unions, took a similar position after Fidel Velazquez, the union's leader, expressed his 
unconditional support of NAFTA, reflecting the CTM's working relations to the PRI 
(Russell, 1994). 
The great achievement of the Salinas administration was the negotiation of NAFTA, 
uniting three countries (Canada, Mexico and U. S .) in an enormous economic market. 
However, in reality, NAFTA offered multinationals the capacity to combine and take 
advantage of three main components : U. S . capital, Canadian natural resources, and cheap 
Mexican labor (La Botz, 1995). 
Salinas significantly increased the already formidable powers of the executive branch 
of his government. In order to carry out a series of extensive economic reforms, Salinas 
implemented broad policy-granting authority to the technocratic elite which was committed 
to market economics, privatization and trade liberalization, mainly with the United States and 
Canada. In an effort to attract U. S . investment to the country, Salinas launched an ambitious 
four-page advertisement in the U.S press. In the text Salinas scheduled his priorities in the 
following order: maintaining the fight against inflation, encouraging entrepreneurial 
investment, continuing privatization and deregulation, and proceeding with the opening of 
the economy (Weintraub, 1990). 
In 1990, Salinas acted rapidly and further implemented his economic policies: 
Cananea, a government-owned company producing silver and gold, which also possessed 
one of the ten largest copper mines in the world, was sold (Teichman, 1996). The copper 
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mine in the state of Sonora was one of the first objectives of privatization of the Salinas 
administration; however, workers refused to accept it and radically opposed the move. 
Salinas reacted and sent 4,000 Mexican troops to seize the town of Cananea (which had not 
been occupied since 1906, the year that President Porfirio Diaz had intended to crush an 
anarchist strike). Eighty-three years later, the Salinas government declared the copper mine 
bankrupt in order to sell it to private Mexican and foreign investors. Many workers resisted, 
but Salinas finally succeeded (Russell, 1994). 
The next state-owned company on the Salinas "hit list" was TELMEX (Mexican 
Telephone Company). Deemed a decisive factor for the creation of a modern national 
economy, PRI's technocrats saw telecommunications as key to bring in Mexico into the 
world economy. Salinas was aware of the challenge that he faced in the privatization of 
TELMEX against opposition from radical groups already embedded in the company. 
However, rather than using force as he did at the Cananea copper mine, Salinas chose a 
strategy of tact and diplomacy. Francisco Hernandez Juarez, who became the leader of the 
STRM (Telephone Workers Union) in 1976 after a string of radical changes in the union, 
appeared to pose an obstacle for the Salinas TELMEX privatization plan. However, in 
previous actions, even before the presidential elections, Salinas had gained favor with 
Hernandez Juarez by making him an important national business figure. This shrewd move 
by Salinas in boosting the stature of Hernandez Juarez would ensure that the STRM would 
not oppose privatization. Compared with the Cananea copper mine, TELMEX was by no 
means an unprofitable company. In the 1980s TELMEX's sales exceeded one billion dollars 
annually; therefore Salinas justified TELMEX's privatization as part of the modernization of 
the country. On December 9 1989, TELMEX was sold for 3.9 billion dollars to a consortium 
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made up of Grupo Carso, headed by Carlos Slim Helu and also including several American 
corporations such as Southwestern Bell and the St. Louis-based U.S. Corporation (La Botz, 
1995). 
The following table shows Mexico's Foreign Investment from 1970-2000: 
Table 3 
Foreign Investment in Mexico 
Totals 
Administration (U.S. $Millions) %Change 
1970-1976 1, 601.40 
1976-1982 5,470.60 241.7 
1982-1988 13,455.40 146 
1988-1994 60,565.5a 350.1 
1994-2000 74,100.90 22.3 
Source: Cronica del gobierno de Carlos Salinas 
de Gortari, sintesis e indice tematico (Mexico 
City: Presidencia de la Republica, Sexto informe 
de gobierno, anexo, September 1, 2000). 
a8eginning in 1989, investment figures included 
those in the Mexican Stock Exchange; the data 
for 2000 are as of 30 June. 
Salinas also privatized the banking system, which had been nationalized in 1982. 
Eight years later, in 1990, Salinas declared, "A state with too much property, with so many 
resources tied up in banks, is unacceptable when it has so many other demands to attend. 
Now the resources from the bank sale and additional resources which will not have to be 
used to modernize banking can be used to respond to more pressing demands of the Mexican 
people." This statement increased business conk deuce and the bank sale raised more than 
$12 billion. Highway construction was the next target of Salinas administration. Private 
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investors were allowed to pay for the construction of four-lane highways, while at the same 
time tolls were charged to recover the private investment, make a profit and eventually 
transfer the highways to the public sector (Russell, 1994). 
Salinas moved rapidly to privatize as much of the economy as quickly as possible. 
Large numbers of state enterprises were sold: the quantity of these was reduced from 
1, 5 5 5 in 1982 to only 217 in 1992. Among the most important were TELMEX and the 
Cananea copper mine, as mentioned before, but also included in the movement to 
privatization were the country's two leading airlines, Ae~omexico and Mexicana, and the 
state steel mill, Altos Ho~nos de Mexico. Thus, Salinas transformed the Mexican economy 
into a model of private enterprise, in which the center of the whole project was foreign 
investment and privatization (La Botz, 1995). 
The state obtained more than $3 billion from the deal involving its ten largest 
corporations, money that was mainly used in social spending. However, enterprises such as 
PEMEX (Mexican Petroleum Company), the railroads and CONASUPO (National Company 
of Popular Subsistence) should continue in government hands (Handelman, 1997). 
De la Madrid's administration had initiated these radical changes in the Mexican 
economy. At the time Salinas had been the architect of the new economic model before his 
presidency when he was the Ministry of Programming and Budget. Later, as president, he 
took the decisive step toward structural reforms. 
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CHAPTER II. ERNESTO ZEDILLO PONCE DE LEON (1994-2000) 
The Unknown 
Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon was born in Mexico City on December 27, 1951. He 
is the son of Martha Alicia Ponce de Leon and Rodolfo Zedillo Castillo, contractor (Camp, 
1995). Even though Ernesto was born in Mexico City, when still a boy, he moved with his 
working class family to the border city of Mexicali, Baja California Norte. According to the 
folklore, he shined shoes to help his mother make ends meet (Preston and Dillon, 2004). 
Zedillo's primary and secondary studies were at public schools in Mexicali (Camp, 1995). 
Mexicali was a city of immigrants hunting for assembly line jobs or waiting to make 
nighttime crossings to the United States; where drug traffic violence and insecurity were 
common — an environment of bad influences on a raw Mexican boy. Therefore, Zedillo was 
sent back to Mexico City to continue his preparatory studies (Preston and Dillon, 2004). He 
attended IPN (National Polytechnic Institute) vocational School No. 5 in the years 1967-
1969. Zedillo was not considered an activist leader, but he participated in the 1968 student 
movement (Camp, 1995). Subsequently he decided to stay in the capital and to attend 
university at IPN, that great conduit for Mexican lower-middle class social mobility (Preston 
and Dillon, 2004). He obtained an economics degree in the Higher Economic School of the 
IPN in the years 1962-1972 (Camp, 1995). Since Zedillo was an honor student, in a time 
when Mexican welfare state's meritocracy was at the peak of his efficiency, he gained a 
government scholarship that allowed him to continue his studies in the United States (Preston 
and Dillon, 2004). Ernesto Zedillo obtained an M.A. in Economics at Yale University as well 
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as a Ph.D. in Economics in the same university with a thesis on the external public debt in 
Mexico (Camp, 1995). 
Zedillo joined the PRI when he was twenty; however, he had never to date become 
active in party affairs. Indeed, Zedillo never even sought to run for public office. He began 
his career in government at the Banco de Mexico (the central bank) in 1978. In that era, the 
institution was a very important instrument of the president, yet it remained isolated from 
PRI politicking. In that period Zedillo succeeded in the creation of a program that was 
designed to protect struggling Mexican corporations against currency fluctuations (Preston 
and Dillon, 2004). Zedillo also dedicated time to teaching. In 1973-1974 and 1978-1980, he 
was professor in the High School of Economics at IPN. From 1981-1983, he was professor in 
the Colegio de Mexico (Camp, 1995). In 1987, while managing federal spending in the office 
of the Planning Secretariat, Zedillo initiated a more politically directed career. One year later 
President Salinas assigned him command that office. However, Zedillo was not one of the 
exceptional members of Salinas cabinet. In 1994 Salinas moved Zedillo from the Secretary of 
Planning to the Secretary of Education. At this time Mexico had an atrocious public 
education bureaucracy, which, with a reform in structure, Zedillo was able to decentralize 
(Preston and Dillon, 2004). 
In 1994 Zedillo became the director of Luis Donaldo Colosio's presidential 
campaign, only in the same year he replaced Colosio as PRI presidential candidate following 
Colosio's assassination (Camp, 1995). After the Colosio death, it was very clear that Salinas 
was not thinking of Zedillo as his successor. Instead Salinas was working to obtain a 
constitutional waiver that would allow Pedro Aspe, then Finance Secretary, to contend for 
the presidency (Preston and Dillon, 2004). 
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Zedillo did not receive support from the PRI's old guard, who pressed Salinas to tap 
as presidential candidate the head of the party, Fernando Ortiz Arana, who belonged to the 
"group of dinosaurs" (old style PRI leaders). Zedillo's destape (unveiling of the PRI 
candidate) only served to show the party's lack of enthusiasm. The ceremony of the destape 
was a small gathering in an inner salon and the applause for the new candidate was 
conspicuously reserved. Zedillo's anxious smile revealed his awareness of his party's 
indifference to his candidacy (Preston and Dillon, 2004). 
As it was expected, the struggle for the presidency would be hard for the new PRI 
candidate. Besides, as previously mentioned, Zedillo was not the Salinas man favored to 
occupy the presidential seat after Colosio's assassination. This fact was perhaps reflected in 
the president's doubt that Zedillo could win the election; as a result, Zedillo would have to 
carry out an exceptional electoral campaign in order to defeat the opposition candidates. 
Zedillo contended against Cuauhtemoc Cardenas from the PR.D, who emerged for 
second time as presidential candidate and Diego Fernandez de Cevallos from the PAN. 
Unquestionably, Fernandez de Cevallos unusual attitude was a primordial factor in the race 
for the presidency. Fernandez de Cevallos, a lawyer with an elevated rhetoric, was a brilliant 
exponent of the party's most conservative ideology. In May 1994 the media polls placed him 
ahead after the historic first televised debate, which was watched by millions of Mexicans. In 
this event, Fernandez de Cevallos took advantage of his exceptional oratory skill and handily 
defeated Zedillo and Cardenas in the debate. Yet, inexplicably, Fernandez de Cevallos then 
seemed to disappear from the scene. When he attempted to return to the presidential race, it 
was too late. Many Mexicans concluded that the strange disappearance of Fernandez de 
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Cevallos at a crucial point in the campaign was due to a pay-off by Salinas (Preston and 
Dillon, 2004). 
The federal elections that took Zedillo to the presidency were proclaimed by the IFE 
as the fairest and least corrupt in Mexican history. The Mexican government received the 
congratulations of the Clinton administration for its successful electoral reforms, and the 
electoral process was called by the New York Times, "the cleanest in living memory" (La 
Botz, 1995). However, many Mexicans doubted that the election was actually that clean. 
Certainly the 1994 presidential election was a difficult test of real democracy for Mexican 
government. 
More than 50,000 observers participated, including citizens groups and business 
organizations. In addition the Mexican government allowed the participation of more than 
900 international observers, most of them professionals with careers in social work and 
education. International observers who witnessed the procedure in several states reported 
deficiencies such as manipulation, intimidation and dishonesty. The electoral process of 1994 
was nonetheless the one of the most open elections in Mexican history (La Botz, 1995). 
At the end of the Election Day, a spokesman of the IFE conceded that there had been 
irregularities, but that these did not call into question the legality of the process. An electoral 
adjustment eventually occurred in Mexico; however the Ministry of the Interior, the PRI-
government's enforcer, remained in control of the IFE and, in turn, of the electoral process. 
The official results certified that Zedillo of the PRI had won with 50.18 percent of the vote, 
while Diego Fernandez de Cevallos of the PAN received 26.9 percent, and Cuauhtemoc 
Cardenas of the PRD a surprisingly 17.08 percent (La Botz, 1995). 
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Error of December 
Mexico suffered important economic transformations, especially between 1984 and 
1994. However, since the presidential term of Luis Echeverria (1970-1976), all of the 
presidential administrations have finished with an economic crisis (Echeverria 1976, Lopez 
Portillo 1982, de la Madrid 1987, and Salinas 1994). The economic modifications 
implemented by President Salinas and his group of technocrats directed the country, for the 
first time in years, to economic growth and, in general, to economic stability. A balanced 
budget, a free trade agreement with the main economies of the world, and an autonomous 
central bank that could implement a monetary policy able to endure in a tense political 
environment: these were just some of the elements established by Salinas to overcome 
Mexico's economic woes. Yet, the new economic plan could not avoid the catastrophic crisis 
of December 1994. Neglect, arrogance and the lack of timely decisions especially by the 
government led to a deep financial crisis (Gonzalez, 1998). 
The unexpected December debacle was not, in fact, a surprise. During Salinas entire 
term as president, observers had warned of a financial crisis and criticized the 
administration's economic policy. On the other hand, for millions of Mexicans who believed 
that the country had finally entered into the First World, the December devaluation was a 
shock. It was also a bombshell for those entrepreneurs who had become indebted in dollars or 
had changed from national providers to international ones, reaching better quality and prices 
(Castaneda, 1995). 
In 1994 Mexico had lived moments of political tension and the PRI was the object of 
hard questions. In May of 1993, drug dealers murdered Cardinal Juan Jesus Posadas, an 
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important catholic official. Later in January, the EZLN established a presence in the state of 
Chiapas, and in March the presidential candidate of the PRI, Luis Donaldo Colosio, was 
assassinated, an event that intensified the political climate. 
The assassination of the PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio had a 
surprising impact on the Mexican economy. As a result of the given conspiratorial character 
of the murder, financial speculation not in favor of the peso developed soon afterwards, thus 
forcing the government to create a line of credit with the U. S . Treasury. In the following 
weeks after the assassination, there was a large reduction of foreign reserves. Down to the 
coming presidential election, the Salinas administration continued its policy of supporting the 
peso, even though the central bank had lost a massive quantity of money. After the 
recommendation of a group of foreign financial investors, the Mexican government appeared 
with the idea of allowing investors to shift from Mexican bonds to Tesobonos, bonds that 
even if peso denominated, were indexed to the dollar. As a result, many investors, avoiding 
an exchange rate risk, acquired large amounts of Tesobonos which, at the end of July, 
equaled in the hands of investors the total value of the Mexican foreign reserves (Urzua, 
1997). 
As the savings of the Mexicans were not enough, those resources coming from the 
foreigner market were used to cover the excess of consumption expense; unfortunately the 
entrance of the money went to short term and not to capital investments. Alternatively the 
rise of interest rates in other countries caused the flow of resources to move toward those 
markets, leaving the country in a maj or overdraft. 
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The Tesobonos were not as effective as the government thought to maintain the 
country in the correct course. By the second half of 1994, foreign capital flow plummeted 75 
percent and reserves dropped from $30 billion to $6 billion (Crandall, Paz and Roett, 2005). 
In August of that year, Zedillo won the presidential election by a margin large enough 
to calm the investors for a while, since receiving 48.7 percent of the total vote showed a 
certain political stability, though in the following weeks the government let pass the last 
opportunity to correct the trade disproportion through an unanticipated devaluation. In 
September, Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu, former PRI secretary, was assassinated, and soon 
after; Ruiz Massieu's brother was appointed by President Salinas as the Deputy Attorney 
General in charge of the murder case. However, days later he resigned claiming complicity 
with PRI bosses in the homicide, and thus the government witnessed a further decline of 
several billions in the reserves (Urzua, 1997). 
Zedillo took office in late 1994 facing these dramatic economic changes. Jaime Serra 
Puche, new Secretary of Finances, opted to maintain the line through December and into 
early 1995, negotiating with Washington where he had many friends to set a credit 
arrangement in order to restore Mexican investors' confidence. Serra Puche bet everything 
on that strategy, leaning on Zedillo's overwhelming electoral victory. In addition, he stated 
that in 1995 the Mexican economy would return the growth as a result of NAFTA. Days later 
Serra Puche declared in an interview for The Wall Street Journal that the Mexican economy 
was well in hand and that Zedillo's administration did not expect to make any alterations in 
exchange rate policy. However the markets shook one more time, due to the new frictions 
between the Zapatista guerrilla group and the Zedillo administration. On December 19, the 
Mexican press declared the capture and occupation of more than thirty Chiapas villages by 
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the EZLN; even though the reality was that they only had seized one town and blocked some 
highways. Nevertheless, the Mexican peso and reserve index both plunged (Preston and 
Dillon, 2004). 
With investors selling pesos at the rate promoted by the central bank, on December 
20, 1994, Zedillo's administration extended the exchange rate band by 15 percent. As a 
result, Mexico's foreign reserves dropped by $4 billion. The flow of international capital led 
investors to sell pesos in large amounts and the nominal price of the peso plunged from three 
pesos per U.S. dollar to six per dollar (Crandall, Paz and Roett, 2005). 
President Zedillo, days after the beginning of the crisis, appeared on National 
television announcing the severe situation of the Mexican economy and for the first time 
accepted that the peso had to be devalued. Besides, for the first time President Zedillo 
declared that the Salinas administration was responsible for the financial crisis of the country 
(Urzua, 1997). 
The government suggested a peso float in an act of desperation. Subsequently, they 
expanded the flotation band to a margin that would prove to further weaken the peso. The 
private sector, wishing to avoid a float, even as it was told the urgency of the situation, 
proceeded to withdraw its money rapidly. After the peso was allowed to float, there were 
almost no reserves left (Castaneda, 1995). 
After the 15 percent exchange rate devaluation the financial markets considered it 
insufficient to correct the current account imbalance. For that reason, after the exchange 
correction, the Bank of Mexico performed open market operations with government bonds at 
interest rates over 30 percent, thus accepting that the 15 percent devaluation was not enough. 
Exchange rate and credibility crisis followed (Gonzalez, 1998). 
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The shocking financial situation of the country was amplified due to the large 
obligations of foreign debt which dramatically threatened an economic collapse; furthermore, 
a default became imminent or a forced rescheduling of foreign debt. Yet, with the purpose of 
avoiding an economic catastrophe, U. S . President Bill Clinton loaned Mexico $47 billion, the 
funds integrating contributions from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), and the United States Exchange Stabilization Fund. 
Unquestionably the loan was a sign to the investor field (domestic and international) of the 
support of United States to the Zedillo administration. Mexico made use of the immense 
credit line to replace the missing capital of its foreign reserve and continued to service and 
reschedules its debt (Crandall, 2005). 
The loan was in part a plan of rescue which included some specific conditions. One of 
the conditions was that the buyers of Mexican oil would send their payments directly to a 
special account in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, avoiding the possibility that 
Mexico miss its obligations (payments). Other requirements were an increase of the IVA 
(Value Added Tax) from 10% to 15% which included increases of the gasoline price and 
electric tariffs as well as the maximum of the domestic credit. The rescue plan concluded 
with the requirement to privatize some sectors of the Mexican economy, such as railroads, 
ports and petrochemical industries, and the opening of the banking system to foreign capital 
(Urzua, 1997). 
Certainly, Mexico paid a dear price; after December 1994 the Mexican economy was 
severely affected as a result of the crisis. A disastrous proof of that was that in 1995 the 
Mexican economy contracted by 6.2 percent in real terms, the largest decline since the 
catastrophic year of 1932 (Gonzalez, 1998). 
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Break of the Bank System 
An adjustment in the exchange rate to an overvalued peso by the Salinas 
administration could have been a measure to avoid disaster. After the December debacle, the 
immediate result was the damage to the patrimony of the Mexicans. The loans in credit cards, 
automobiles and mortgages were overextended past their credit and refinancing limits. The 
capacity of the borrowers to make payments on these obligations decreased and in some 
cases were non-existent, and so therefore was generated the largest debt portfolio in the 
history of the Mexican financial institutions. Mexico operated with a fragile financial system, 
since the banks had an enormous debt to pay and the recovery of the credit that had been 
previously granted was very slow and in many cases in doubt of payment. 
It is true that the rescue plan could have prevented the Mexican economic situation 
from going too far into the red. However the country could not avoid falling in a deep 
recession. During 1995 the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) plummeted by 6 percent. The 
confused situation unleashed a wave of crime in the entire country, most notably in Mexico 
City (Crandall, 2005). 
The recession was so deep that it could have been called a depression. Thousands of 
workers lost their jobs and real minimum wages plunged over 20%; annual inflation went up 
to 52% in 1995 before falling to around 30% in 1996. One of the costs of rescuing the broken 
financial system was reflected in the 5% drop in GDP and at least as much in 1996 (Urzua, 
1997). 
The Salinas administration had privatized the Mexican banks in 1992 after a decade 
of government ownership. Thus, by the end of 1994, Mexico had 32 private financial 
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institutions with $160 billion of aggregate assets. In the beginning of the year (1995) six of 
the leading banks in the country, Banamex, Bancome~, Se~fin, Banco Mexicano, Come~mex 
and Bital, reported earnings of more than $100 billion representing 70 percent of the entire 
Mexican banking industry. Yet, these banks showed a lack of interest toward the customer 
base. In the years of 1993 and 1994 the entire bank industry was under remarkable pressure 
to expand its operations (Adams, 1997). 
The growth of credit caused economic confusion; therefore a considerable past due 
loan portfolio came out, mainly caused by bank's inefficient credit policies. Banks did not 
give the necessary attention to the situation in the market; consequently the excessive credit 
growth debilitated banks as well as borrowers. Thus, the financial institutions and borrowers 
suffered from moderated asset quality and higher financial margins respectively (Gavito, 
Silva and Zamarripa, 1998). 
The economic crisis of December 1994 severely affected the fragile financial system 
which was reflected in three main indicators: asset quality, capitalization, and liquidity. In 
addition, domestic reluctance over the NAFTA and a light recession in 1993 began to 
deteriorate the banks. By the end of 1994 Mexican financial institutions confirmed past due 
loans sorted from 9 to 14 percent of their portfolios, thus the Federal Reserve became 
conscious of the imminent impact of what was happening on the monetary system (Adams, 
1997). 
During the first months of 1995 a risk of insolvency by the banks was exposed, due 
to the susceptibility of the Mexican financial sector. In addition, as mentioned earlier, there 
existed the need of a union between financial institutions and the customer base. This 
weakness, coupled to the considerable rise in interest rates and the severe shrinkage in the 
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average maturity of debt instruments, caused further turmoil. Also, the existence of a highly 
concentrated banking system (only three banks controlled 50 percent of the credit market) 
and a high wealth concentration (0.17 percent of deposit contracts covered 62 percent of 
bank liabilities), created conditions conductive to provoking a financial meltdown (Gavito, 
Silva and Zamarripa, 1998). 
Debtors received the impact of the new load of interest added to their obligations; in 
addition, there existed a debt that was virtually impossible to pay. Debtors took refuge in the 
arcane bankruptcy law and created groups such as El Barton demanding to receive a break in 
their debt, thus generating more pressure on the fragile banking system (Crandall, 2005). 
El Barton was an alliance of farmers and ranchers from northern Mexico and middle 
class home owners who pressed banks and government for debt relief programs. The group 
demanded the reduction of flood loan defaults that had led to foreclosures in the entire 
country. The organization (El Barton), which reported to have loans amounting over $12 
billion, tried to gain attention by holding loan payments, carrying out massive rallies and 
forcing some banks to temporarily close. However, opponents of this group stated that El 
Barton had merits but did not warrant borrowers receiving total absolution of their debt 
(Adams, 1997). 
The difficult financial situation in the country led the Mexican government to act 
immediately to keep other economic areas, such as the private sector, from being affected. A 
bank with financial problems with the intention of overcoming financial loss, as mentioned 
before, increased its financial margins which forced at the same time a loan recouping 
process. Zedillo's administration attacked the financial crisis establishing some new 
procedures: among these were measures to limit the transmission of the banking crisis to the 
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business sector, to re-establish depositors' confidence, to protect the payment system, to 
promote the restructuring and capitalization of troubled banks, and to support institutions 
rather than shareholders with hopes of minimizing the fiscal cost (Gavito, Silva and 
Zamarripa, 1998). 
Zedillo's administration implemented three main support programs as a reaction to 
the dramatic collapse of the banking system: 1) A debtor support agenda which could help 
families and corporations to repay their debts. 2) Reforming the country's accounting 
principles, banking regulations and supervisory and enforcement practices. 3) Liquidity 
support to the banks, proceedings to recapitalize the banks in exchange for non-performing 
loans, intervention and sale of foreign capitals to the weakest domestic banks and 
restructuring, selling or liquidating intervened banks since owners could not afford enough 
capital to reach the new regulations. All of these were implemented through the FOBAPROA 
(Bank Savings Protection Fund) (Montes-Negret and Landa, 2001). 
FOBAPROA was created in 1990 under the Law of Institutions of Credit by Mexican 
government. During 1995, Zedillo's administration, in response to the financial crisis, 
ordered to the SHOP (Mexican Treasury Department) and Mexico's Central Bank to embark 
on FOBAPROA to absorb bad loans made by Mexican banks. FOBAPROA was meant to 
inject liquidity into the vulnerable Mexican financial sector (La Botz, 1998). 
Zedillo's administration declared that FOBAPROA existed to rescue the banking 
system from its remarkable and disastrous crisis and to protect the deposits of ordinary 
citizens. Most of the bad loans were absorbed by FOBAPROA; however, most of them came 
from banks and corporations which had been allied with Presidents Salinas and Zedillo. 
Suspiciously some of the money involved was used to finance the PRI's election campaigns. 
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The amounts overdue were accepted by the government without the consent of the legislature 
and the opposition parties, even though the Mexican Constitution required legislative 
approval before contracting a public debt (La Botz, 1998). 
Mexico's eleven largest banks composed half of the total liabilities of FOBAPROA, 
which was calculated at $65 billion. Zedillo received attacks which stated that FOBAPROA 
had rescued wealthy bankers from precarious loans, loans that they should never have made. 
In addition, the cost of the debt was to be absorbed into the public debt which cost Mexicans 
around 1 S percent of the GDP (Crandall, 2005). 
The opposition parties refused to accept that bad loans be placed into the public debt, 
as Zedillo's administration suggested, and insisted on knowing who benefited from these 
loans. Radical parties such as PRD even published a list of the banks, corporations, and 
individuals rescued by FOBAPROA (La Botz, 1998). 
President Zedillo had to struggle with the bank crisis for the rest of his term. His 
administration was a lost period for the banks, since it took more than four years to overcome 
the "containment phase" of the banking crisis. The role of the financial institutions as 
monetary intermediaries had declined dramatically since the beginning of December 1994 
with the economic catastrophe. Yet, indicators stated that after six years the banking industry 
showed signs of improvement (Giugale, 2001). 
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The Recovering and the Maquila 
By the beginning of 1996 Mexico seemed to have overcome the financial crisis that 
had shaken the country. Even though the recovery was more rapid than expected, the country 
still suffered from many problems. The economic indicators pointed to a rate of 4 percent of 
economic growth; in fact the Zedillo administration had completely reimbursed the loan that 
it received from the United States government (Krause, 1997). 
The evidence of progress was reflected in Mexico by a successful export 
performance. Increasing foreign trade allowed the Mexican economy to penetrate in highly 
competitive international markets. Mexico had overcome the period in which uncertainty had 
prevailed over the doubt and ability to export Mexican products, thus achieving one of the 
clearest signs of increased efficiency of an economy (Winkler, 1998). 
NAFTA projected by Salinas administration and which went into effect on January 1, 
1994, entailed reciprocal trade liberalization among Mexico; United States and Canada. 
Therefore, Mexico's external performance had to develop dramatically in order to achieve 
positive results. Mexican manufacturing goods assumed a new leading role as a result of the 
increase of Mexican participation in the world market (Cimoli, 2001). 
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The following table shows Mexico's merchandise trade with the U.S. from 1980-
1996: 
Table 4 
Mexico's Merchandise Trade with the United States, 1980-1996 (millions of U.S. dollars 
unless otherwise indicated) 
Annual Annual Annual 
Percentage Percentage Total Percentage 
Year Exports Change Imports Change Balance Trade Change 
1980 10, 072 61.1 11, 979 58.4 -1, 907 22, 051 59.6 
1981 10, 716 6.4 15, 398 28.5 -4, 682 26,114 18.4 
1982 11, 887 10.9 8, 921 -42.1 2, 926 20, 808 -20.3 
1983 13,034 9.7 4,958 -44.4 8,076 17,992 -13.5 
1984 14,612 12.1 6,695 35 7,917 21,307 18.4 
1985 15, 029 2.9 11,132 66.3 3, 897 26,161 22.8 
1986 17,600 17.1 12,400 11.4 5,200 30,000 14.7 
1987 20, 270 15.2 14, 569 17.5 5, 701 34, 839 16.1 
1988 23,277 14.8 20,633 41.6 2,644 43,910 26 
1989 27,186 16.8 24,969 21 2,217 52,155 18.8 
1990 30,172 11 28,375 13.6 1,797 58,547 12.3 
1991 31,194 3.4 33,276 17.3 -2,082 64,470 10.1 
1992 35,200 12.8 40,600 22 -5,400 75,800 17.6 
1993 39, 930 13.4 41, 636 2.6 -1, 706 81, 566 7.6 
1994 49,492 24 50,843 22.1 -1,351 100,335 23 
1995 61,706 24.7 46,312 -8.9 15,349 108,018 7.7 
1996 72,962 18.2 56,763 22.6 16,199 129,725 20.1 
Source: Annual Reports on U.S. Trade by Country, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1980-1996. 
Over the decade of the 1980's the performance of Mexico's exports improved from 
the value of sales of $24 billion in 1982 to almost $100 billion in 1996. These numbers 
placed Mexico in the group of the top ten leading export countries in the world. In the early 
80's, the country's economy was based in petroleum exports; Mexico was considered almost 
a mono-export economy; however after a decade, the country went from cone-product 
exporter to one in which manufactured goods were 83 percent of all exports. Indicators show 
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that in the same period sales of exported manufactured goods went from $6.2 billion to $81.2 
billion; in addition, the average annual increase in foreign sales of manufactured goods was 
17.4 percent, three times the rate of export growth worldwide (Winkler, 1998). 
Undeniably, Mexico's economic relationship with United States was the main 
impetus that pulled the country out of the remarkable crisis. During 1995 and 1996, the U. S 
economy found the path for rapid economic growth, after having suffered a light recession. 
As a result, Mexican goods, cheaper in real terms, were in high demand by the U. S ., taking 
the Mexican economy to extraordinarily positive levels. During Zedillo's administration the 
dynamism of the Mexican export sector greatly strengthened the Mexican economy 
(Crandall, 2005). 
From 1995-1997 the export sector performance had been more remarkable than the 
domestic sector. During 1995-1996 exports increased 53 percent, while internal production 
for the domestic market was shrinking 8 percent. This variation however, represented a 
problem, since the domestic economy represented about 70 percent of total economic 
activity, which included a large number of companies and generated most local employment 
(Gonzalez, 1998). 
Mexico's economic performance during the second half of Zedillo's administration 
was notable. Between 1995 and early 2000 the GDP grew by an average of 5.1 percent, and 
inflation that had reached an astonishing 52 percent in 1995, in 2000 barely reached 4.4 
percent. In addition the overvalued exchange rate that had caused so much damage during 
1994, enhanced the domestic market significantly (Crandall, 2005). 
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The following table shows Mexico's main component of real GDP growth from 
1994-1996: 
Table 5 
Main Components of Real GDP Growth (percentage) 
1994 1995 1996 
GDP 3.5 -6.2 5.1 
Consumption 3.5 -6.8 2.5 
Private 3.7 -6.9 2.3 
Public 2.5 -6.4 3.7 
Investment 8.1 -29.1 17.7 
Exports 7.3 36.4 18.7 
Imports 12.9 -12.1 27.8 
Source: Grupo de Economistas y Asociados, 
based on information from the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica (INEGI). 
Mexico made important gains due to access to new and more competitive markets 
and especially with the involvement in NAFTA. Latin American countries, and especially 
Mexico, had previously been vulnerable due to the lack of access to international capital 
markets, which became a factor in the severe financial crises. However, the Mexican 
economy bounced back with a stronger showing in 2000 than in the mid 1990s. Zedillo's 
administration was conscious of the fact that Mexico was vulnerable to external market 
shocks; therefore, to avoid another financial crisis, the Mexican government negotiated an 
emergency line of foreign financing, which worked as a line of credit, mostly performed by 
its NAFTA partners. Furthermore, Mexico benefited from three important market forces - 
commercial earnings with its central associates, high oil prices and the productivity of the 
Mexican industry (Corbo, 2001). 
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As mentioned previously, the opening of new markets, given by NAFTA, provided 
Mexico a place in the competitive world market. Thus, better quality and competitively 
priced Mexican goods entered the market place in other countries. Exports included a vast 
variety of manufactured goods. However, those exported goods were concentrated in the 
hands of a small number of companies, a practice that followed all exporter countries 
(Winkler, 1998). 
The Maquiladora (assembly plant) Industry became the main support of the country 
in achieving economic growth. Maquiladoras began to develop along the U.S. border in the 
beginning of 1980s. American-made parts were assembled in Mexico and then exported back 
to the United States. Even when NAFTA had not yet been proposed by the Salinas 
administration, Mexico became the third most frequent U. S . trading partner, just behind 
Canada and Japan. By the end of the 1980s, Mexico was the largest exporter of color 
televisions, computer keyboards and refrigerators to the United States. In 1990 the Salinas 
administration decided to direct the Mexican economy to an export-oriented industrialization 
with NAFTA (Handelman, 1997). 
The disappearance of the legal requirement to have a border location similar to the 
maquilado~a model and the option of using domestic components (free of U.S. import taxes) 
to reduce the advantage of a border locality, favored the establishment of maquilado~as in all 
parts of the country, mostly in southern and central Mexico. By the end of the decade (1990s) 
almost one third of the maquilado~a companies and around one fifth of maquiladora 
employees were situated in non-border states. In these states the proportion of maquilado~a 
establishments doubled, and maquilado~a jobs and worker remuneration had grown rapidly. 
In sectors such as apparel where the wages were low, new high-tech factories employing 
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more skilled workers gave Mexico the best chance to create new jobs and for workers to 
become better remunerated (Gereffi and Martinez, 2005). 
Transportation equipment, textiles and apparel, and electronics are the three main 
maquilado~a sectors. Transportation equipment has become important in the U.S. import 
market with several components of this industry related to vehicle transports. They are 
produced by subsidiaries of the three main automobile manufacturers. U.S. textile and 
apparel is a very competitive industry group in which Mexico, as well as several Caribbean 
countries, struggle to match the assembled U.S. products. However after NAFTA took effect, 
Mexico benefited and the sewn apparel was among the fastest growing maquilado~a 
segments. Assembled electronics components that include goods from semiconductors to 
television parts are the last maquilado~a element which compete with several Asian countries 
including Malaysia, Korea and the Philippines. By 1996, with a total production of $35 
billion, there were 754, 858 employees in 2,411 plants with investment heavily dominated by 
U.S. business. Of all the existent maquilado~as in Mexico, 43% were totally owned by 
Mexican interest, 3 8% by U. S . parties, and 14% by Mexican-U. S . organizations. The 
remaining 5%came under Japanese and other foreign interest ownership (Bates, 2002). 
Undeniably, maquilado~a exports are crucial for consistent performance from the 
Mexican economy. A clear example is that in 1991, maquiladora industry generated $15.8 
billion in exports and provided work to 446,000 Mexicans; by the beginning of 2000 the 
industry had developed to $77 billion in profits with over 1 million employees. In fact in 
2001, 15 percent of the country's GDP belonged to maquilado~a export industry (Gereffi and 
Martinez, 2005). 
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Recovering from the shock of the 1994-1995, Zedillo's administration had made 
significant progress in reordering its public finances, in stabilizing its economy and 
increasing its economic growth rate. Besides, the foreign debt was being managed over a 
long term, making Mexico able to rescue its financial system. Moreover these advances were 
even more valuable, since the second half of 1997 until early 1999; all the Latin American 
countries experienced the aftershocks of the crises of the emerging markets of East Asia and 
Russia. Among the achievements reached at macroeconomic levels by Zedillo's 
administration, was the reduction of the programmable State spending from 17.5 percent of 
GDP in 1994, to a 1 S .6 percent in 2000. In addition indicators showed that between 1996 and 
2000 the Mexican economy had an average annual growth rate of 5 percent. However despite 
these enormous achievements, Mexico was still struggling with the improvement of living 
conditions nationwide and the reduction of high (current) levels of poverty (Corbo, 2001). 
Democratic Transition 
By the end of Zedillo's administration the PRI was agitated with internecine 
jealousies since President Zedillo had announced a primary election in order to name the next 
PRI presidential candidate. Zedillo was betraying the PRI's most powerful principle: "el 
dedazo " (presidential appointment of the party's next nominee). Zedillo's goal was to help 
the party hold on to the presidency by making it more viable, yet the new strategy implicated 
a certain degree of risk, since Zedillo was proposing a competition between rival presidential 
aspirants in which the PRI could intensify its internal struggle (Preston and Dillon, 2004). 
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Mexico's PRI presidential candidates were decided by the top brass of the party, not 
by open primaries. PRI's system worked more by party loyalty rather than in a democratic 
way. If members of the PRI were satisfied with a candidacy, a bureaucratic position, a senate 
seat, or a governorship, that candidate was appointed in exchange for his permanent devotion 
to the party. Therefore the incoming president protected the interests of the former president 
in order to obtain the candidacy. This antidemocratic system worked in Mexico's ruling party 
for decades (Dresser, 2003). 
With the intention of mediating the internal struggle for the candidacy, President 
Zedillo created the Committee for the Development of the Internal Process, as Well 
nominated as chair a traditionalist intensely loyal to the PRI. Consequently four important 
leaders of the party contested for the desired candidacy. PRI hard liners claimed that the new 
and historic process would cause chaos in the party. Therefore they demanded Zedillo that 
cancel the primary process. Yet, the process continued and it became a hostile and 
unrestrictive fight between Francisco Labastida Ochoa, former government secretary and ex-
governor of Sinaloa, and Roberto Madrazo Pintado who had held a seat in the congress as 
well as being ex-governor of the state of Tabasco (Wiarda and Kline, 2001). 
By November 1999 the internal election for the presidential candidate of the PRI was 
carried out and in it some irregularities were reported. Yet, Labastida won the primary in a 
firm Way. In response Madrazo threatened to desert the party; he stayed, nevertheless, having 
to tolerate his defeat. Meanwhile President Zedillo and his collaborators celebrated this 
achievement by his administration, even though it was not an historic act to celebrate for 
many PRI members (Preston and Dillon, 2004). 
58 
With the internal presidential elections, President Zedillo accomplished four 
important tasks in favor of his party. These included taking the PRI from underdog situation, 
weakening the ability of future presidents to capriciously choose successors, involving one 
fifth of the almost 60 million voters, and finally enabling Labastida, a powerful candidate, to 
compete with the strong candidates of the opposition, PAN: Vicente Fox and PRD: 
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas. This resurgence by the PRI led to the candidates of the opposition 
(Fox and Cardenas) to consider a coalition to finally remove the PRI from "Los Pinos " 
(presidential residence). However they never reached an agreement, and so this option was 
discarded (Wiarda and Kline, 2001). 
Vicente Fox had established his presidential campaign based on "The Millennium 
Project" which was a very carefully constructed assignment considered a political manual 
and a roadmap. Fox and his team succeeded by carrying out an exceptional presidential 
campaign which at the end was reflected in the polls on July 2, 2000. The final results 
indicated that Fox's coalition, the Alliance for Change, won 43.7 percent of the vote, PRI and 
Labastida with 36.91 percent and Cardenas Alliance for Mexico with 17.02 percent (Dresser, 
2003). 
At the end of the Election Day (July 2, 2000), close to midnight, in an unscheduled 
and controversial television appearance, President Zedillo declared that Vicente Fox, the 
candidate of the PAN, was the next constitutional president of Mexico, thus ending 71 years 
of rule of PRI. Democracy became a reality in the life of many Mexicans; there was no doubt 
that Fox had won and that the President of Mexico had declared him the victor (Preston and 
Dillon, 2004). 
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The election of Vicente Fox, the victorious candidate of the PAN, had shown for the 
first time that the long-standing ruling party PRI had failed to secure the presidential chair. 
At the same time the defeat marked the conclusion of a process of political reforms that had 
been building for fifteen years and that had culminated with Zedillo's administration. After 
2000 Mexico had entered into the sphere of democratic politics (Rubio and Kaufman, 2004). 
Mexico's 2000 presidential election was different from all preceding elections in 
several ways. First, the internal election of the PRI opened a new road to democracy; second, 
an independent electoral commission (IFE) was in charge; third, the media was more 
independent, the PRI did not limit the press in covering its candidate; and finally, Mexicans 
showed a new perception of political culture, since younger and middle class voters (the 
majority) supported PAN, while older tended for the PRI, following an aged relation with the 
ruling party (Wiarda and Kline, 2001). 
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The following table shows the distribution of preferences according to voter's profiles 
in the 2000 presidential election: 
Table 6 
Distribution of Preferences According to Voters' Profiles, in % (July 2000) 
%of the 
Labastida Fox Cardenas Others sample 
Total 36 45 17 2 100 
Education level 
University 22 60 15 3 15 
Baccalaureate 28 53 16 3 21 
Secondary 34 49 15 2 22 
Primary 46 35 18 1 34 
None 46 30 21 3 8 
Gender 
Male 32 47 20 1 52 
Female 40 43 14 3 48 
Age 
55 or older 42 34 23 1 13 
45-55 38 45 16 1 14 
35-45 36 44 16 4 24 
25-35 34 48 15 3 31 
18-24 32 50 17 1 18 
Source: Exit poll, Reforma, July 3, 2000. 
The IFE gained power as an institution, seeing that the weakness in its election 
system became more solid and denoting a new era in the political life of Mexico. IFE 
emerged in the 2000 presidential election as a consolidated and strong entity; its 
representatives confirmed impartiality and intelligence, good sense and professionalism. The 
organization proved that it was able to carry out an impeccable election day; tasks such as the 
installation of electoral booths on time, flowing of data in a regular manner and the high 
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training of the electoral councils. All of these allowed IFE to have credibility in the country. 
Therefore it was undeniable that the institutional reform was crucial in dealing with the 
pressing items of Mexico's transition to democracy. Mexico after the 2000 elections became 
a more democratic country and a more open society (Dresser, 2003). 
In July 2000, Mexicans, by taking a huge and crucial step, completed their democratic 
transition. The elections of 2000 were considered the cleanest and most open vote in 
Mexican history; the country elected a candidate of the opposition (Vicente Fox) to end the 
more than seventy years of one party rule. Zedillo's administration accepted the results and 
stepped aside. Many Mexicans did not notice the magnitude of the event, since the 
democratic transition was carried out in an efficient and peaceful way (Preston and Dillon, 
2004). 
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CHAPTER III. VICENTE FOX QUESADA (2000-2006) 
The Newcomer 
Vicente Fox was born in Mexico City on July 2, 1942. He is the second of nine 
children born to farmer Jose Luis Fox, and Mercedes Quesada. While very young, Fox 
moved with his family to the San Cristobal Ranch in the municipality of San Francisco del 
Rincon, in the state of Guanajuato. Vicente Fox grew up on a farm where he had the 
opportunity to share his childhood with the children of the peasants who were communal 
land owners. Undeniably it was an experience that influenced his life, since he could 
experience close up one of the evils (poverty) that unnecessarily afflicted Mexico (Garcia, 
2004). 
Vicente Fox remained for most of his education in his home town, Leon Guanajuato, 
where he attended La Sallist and Jesuit schools. Contrary to his PRI predecessors, Vicente 
Fox only completed an undergraduate business administration degree in the UTA 
(Iberoamericana University) in Mexico City. Since Fox was not a professional politician, nor 
employed in the federal bureaucracy, the broad enrollment criteria created by influential 
political mentors and presidents did not influence his preparation. However although Fox did 
not earn a graduate degree, he acquired a diploma from a short advanced management course 
from Harvard (Camp, 2003). 
After graduation, Vicente Fox never planned to go into politics, but rather he worked 
for fifteen years in Coca-Cola de Mexico in which he started supervising delivery routes and 
ending up as chief executive. In 1979, after a successful career in the multinational 
63 
corporation, Fox left the company and in turn Mexico City. Consequently he settled in 
Guanajuato to help his brothers manage the large family vegetable farm (Preston and Dillon, 
2004). 
Once settled down in Guanajuato, Fox served as a Board Member of the United 
States-Mexico Chamber of Commerce. He also served as the Director of the Grupo Fox, 
whose companies were involved in the farming and agribusiness industries and the 
manufacture of footwear and cowboy boots for export (Garcia, 2004). 
The early 1980s was a time when the PRI's economic management had led to a 
severe economic crisis and the Mexican peso had suffered several devaluations. Therefore in 
early 1988, Fox, then an entrepreneur unhappy with the struggle to turn a profit under the 
thrall of an inept state, determined to run for a seat in the Federal Chamber of Deputies 
(Preston and Dillon, 2004). 
Thus, at the age of forty five, Vicente Fox would begin his political career, which in a 
few years by the hand of his tenacity and charisma would lead him to contend for the 
presidency in the elections of 2000. 
In 1987, Vicente Fox registered with the Guanajuato PAN and became a deputy 
candidate. He could barely give a coherent speech; however, the Guanajuato electorate was 
fed up with the PRI, and he won the election. As a result in August 1988, Fox took his seat in 
the Chamber of Deputies, then serving in its role as an electoral college. Barely had Vicente 
Fox become one of the 240 deputies of the opposition in the Congress, when the Chamber of 
Deputies went into session for the certification of the 1988 fraudulent presidential elections, 
which brought Carlos Salinas to the presidency. The debate in the Congress, which Fox later 
called "the thirty most enjoyable days of my life", lasted several days and at times erupted 
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into violent discussions. On the last day of the debate more than a hundred orators stood to 
condemn the fraudulent electoral process. One of the orators was Vicente Fox, who, standing 
at the microphone, tore slits in two ballots, fashioning them into gigantic ears, imitating the 
outsize ears of Carlos Salinas. In his speech Vicente Fox acted as if Salinas was talking to his 
family: "My children I am feeling sad because I've had to ask many friends to ignore their 
moral principles and help me obtain this triumph. I had to do it because I don't think Mexico 
is ready for democracy." Many PRI deputies tried to stop Fox, but he continued until he had 
finished his parody (Preston and Dillon, 2004). 
By 1991 Vicente Fox determined to run for governor of his native state, Guanajuato. 
Nonetheless after a controversial election, the PRI candidate was declared the winner in what 
a number of observers considered a fraud by the government. As a result and after behind the 
scenes negotiations with President Carlos Salinas, the governorship was given to Carlos 
Medina Plascencia of the PAN on an interim basis (Russell, 1994). Therefore Vicente Fox 
opted for retiring from political activity for nearly the rest of the Salinas administration. 
In such negotiations, after several protests in which Fox and his supporters nearly 
paralyzed the state, President Salinas offered to Luis H. Alvarez and Diego Fernandez de 
Cevallos (PAN leaders) the alternative of another Governor from the PAN instead of Vicente 
Fox. PAN leaders, trying to achieve the greatest gain for their party, convened with Fox, 
since Fox realized that he never could take office if the President was determined to block 
him. As a result Fox returned to his ranch with his future in politics uncertain (Preston and 
Dillon, 2004). 
In 1993 Vicente Fox became involved with apro-democratic civil action movement. 
The organization was called the San Angel Group; at this time Fox made contact with 
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prominent intellectuals, civic leaders, politicians and professionals favoring democracy. The 
San Angel Group was an organization small in numbers, nonetheless very influential, and 
that became involved in electoral processes as a watchdog. Vicente Fox admitted that 
meeting with the San Angel Group helped sustain his struggle for democracy in the country 
(Camp, 2003). 
By 1993 Fox was preparing for another run for governor in Guanajuato, but also 
considering a larger goal: the presidency. However the presidential seat was far away, since 
an article of the Mexican constitution (Article 82, Clause 1) established that only Mexicans 
whose parents were born in Mexico could contend for president (Fox's mother was born in 
Spain). After several consultations and an amendment campaign, in which intellectuals such 
as Octavio Paz and Carlos Fuentes participated signing a petition for the modification of the 
article, the amendment passed the Congress months later. However Fernandez de Cevallos 
was determined to be the PAN candidate in 1994, since he worked secretly with the PRI to 
include a clause that the modification of the article would come into effect until 2000 
(Preston and Dillon, 2004). 
Therefore, in 1995 Fox again ran for the governorship of his state. This time nobody 
stopped him and he won by an undisputedly wide margin. Consequently in December 1995 
Vicente Fox became the first democratically elected PAN Governor in the state of 
Guanajuato. He received the office from Medina Plascencia, interim governor appointed by 
Salinas. The transfer of command from a panista administration to another meant that the 
new governor could initiate his administration without tribulations. However, Fox took an 
excessive amount of time to assemble his agenda and policy formulations, thus when finally 
his Plan of Government was presented, several political observers, as well as informed 
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citizens, were disappointment. Yet, the popularity of Vicente Fox throughout the state 
remained at very high levels (Shirk, 2005). 
Two years before the presidential election, Vicente Fox declared that he would be the 
candidate for his party. Many were concerned because Fox had not served in a main position 
in the national political scene, because he was mostly an unknown, and even his own party 
colleagues thought he lacked the political expertise to contend for the candidacy. However on 
the basis of his position as governor of Guanajuato, using his experience of in this office as a 
manner to promote his image, Fox rapidly rose to prominence on the national scene. 
In addition Fox had governed Guanajuato on the streets and on the television screens, 
consulting, listening, and traveling to the country side obtaining public support for his 
policies. Fox started his campaign for the presidency based in the Millennium Project which 
was created by Jose Luis Gonzalez, Fox's close friend and Colleague in the Coca-Cola 
Company. The project addressed basically how Fox, "the product", would be sold and what 
would induce Mexicans to buy it. Fox was advised by a group of marketing experts who 
indicated to him how to develop a winning personality. Meanwhile, the rest of his team, led 
by Lino Korrodi, another Coca-Cola colleague, dealt with the resources needed to support the 
campaign. Korrodi had created a parallel fund raising and electoral mobilization agency 
called, "Amigos de Fox" (Friends of Fox); thus, Fox proceeded not relying exclusively on the 
PAN's campaign organization (Dresser, 2003). 
On July 2, 2000, Vicente Fox won the elections and became Mexico's President-
Elect, thus, achieving Fox's main objective. At the same time PAN's long struggle to obtain 
the presidency was finished; yet the historic electoral victory and the manner in which it was 
achieved raised questions concerning the party's future path. 
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Enormous Disappointment 
After the electoral process of 2000, Mexico was hoping to achieve a stable democracy 
characterized by equality and the presence of a strong middle class, features that the country 
has never been able to develop. The lack of experience with democracy as well as the 
repercussion of decades of almost dictatorial rule are issues that the country has had to 
confront and has created intense social conflicts which put stress on democratic politics. As a 
result, the task facing Fox was seen as enormous (Levy and Bruhn, 2001). In addition the 
new era of democratic change that Fox claimed to have brought to the country has proved to 
be more difficult and challenging than many had expected (Shirk, 2005). 
President Fox's successful campaign installed the origins of many of his difficulties 
on his administration. In reality Fox assembled a coalition to win the presidency, such 
coalition was basically a group that did not wish another PRI president. As a result several 
members of his party disagreed, since PAN's members favored a pure electoral victory. At 
the moment that Fox structured his cabinet, he opted to reach outside of this complex 
coalition which included representatives with contradictory priorities and agendas. This 
decision was a clear example that Vicente Fox instead of establishing a plan to govern was 
intent on keeping his constituencies close at hand. The deficiency of a strong system in the 
cabinet led each of the sustaining parts to believe that they had priority through its member. 
The result of such diversity of opinion created a lack of cooperation, yet President Fox during 
his first two years of rule was reluctant to make changes (Rubio, 2004). 
Despite the discrepancies within his own party which faced a difficult dilemma, (the 
PAN had to decide to support Fox to win the election, but at the same time winning with Fox 
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as candidate meant that the party risked losing its ideological profile) Vicente Fox could 
defeat the PRI by a substantial margin. However Fox's triumph could be seen more as a 
personal victory than a one of a party. Consequently once Vicente Fox took office, the 
distance between the PAN and the president damaged the executive's governing capacity and 
weakened the party in future elections (Mizrahi, 2003). 
Although Vicente Fox came to the presidency with great confidence regarding the 
policies and reforms that would be accomplished by his administration, his vision was more 
the vague promises of change, rather than specific policy objectives. During his campaign, 
Vicente Fox's most memorable promises were that he would resolve the situation of the 
Chiapas indigenous insurrection in "fifteen minutes" and that his administration would 
accomplish GDP growth rates over 7 percent annually (both promises have not to be near to 
being accomplished). Therefore Fox's administration experienced severe disapproval from 
critics and the public for the wide gap among campaign promises and his actual 
accomplishments in office (Shirk, 2005). 
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The following table shows why Mexicans voters cast their ballots for president in 
2000: 
Table 7 
Why Mexican Voters Cast Their Ballots for President in 2000 
Candidates (percentages) 
Reasons for Fox Labastida Cardenas Others Total 
voting 
Change 66 15 18 1 43 
His proposals 37 42 17 4 22 
The candidate 28 50 18 4 9 
By custom 12 82 5 1 7 
Other 34 43 22 2 6 
Party loyalty 8 79 12 1 5 
Least bad 37 40 20 3 4 
Obligation 31 56 13 0 2 
Don't know 27 55 14 3 2 
Source: Roderic Ai Camp, "Citizen Attitudes Toward Democracy and 
Vicente Fox's Victory in 2000'; Paper presented at Conference on 
Mexico's 2000 Elections, Weatherhead Center, Harvard University 
December 2000. 
By 2001 the worldwide economy fell into recession and as a result Mexican working 
families began to face layoffs. Another promise of Fox's presidential campaign was the 
creation of enough jobs to provide employment for the 1.3 million new workers who go 
through the job market each year. However during the first year of Fox's administration, the 
country lost 500,000 jobs and there was little economic improvement subsequently (today 
Fox's administration is still struggling with that crisis) (Preston and Dillon, 2004). 
It is important to mention that when Vicente Fox took office in 2000, the PRI had 
ruled Mexico for more than 70 years without interruption, therefore it would be extremely 
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hard for a president of another party to reverse the course of history and demonstrate clear 
signs of progress. Vicente Fox raised enormous expectations of change and Mexicans gave 
Fox their vote in exchange for assurances of immediate results. Consequently these 
enormous expectations have already given way to disappointment, as shown in the polls as 
the president's approval rating dropped from a 70 percent job approval in 2000 to an 
unprecedented 45 percent in 2002 (Mizrahi, 2003). 
The following table shows Mexico's presidential approval rate from 2001-2003: 
Table 8 
Presidential Approval Rates, 2001-2003 (In percentages) 
February August February August February May 
2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 2003 
Aprrove 69.7 61.6 44.6 56.7 53.2 63.5 
Disapprove 22.9 32.2 53.1 38 43.4 33.7 
Source: Consulta Mitofsky (www. consulta. com. mx), "Decima evaluacion 
de gobierno del presidente Fox, "May 2003. 
Due to the dramatic transformation of Mexican political life in which presidentialism 
came to an end, Vicente Fox had less room to maneuver even though the electoral euphoria 
after the PAN's triumph had indicated the opposite. Indeed Fox is governing without access 
to the instruments that once the PRI used to rule and with the limitations of a contested 
Congress. More Mexicans voted for Fox than for the PAN: proof of that shown in the 
electoral process of 2000 in which the Congress was elected also, and the "Fox effect" was 
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not enough to win a PAN's majority in the lower house. Therefore Fox's administration 
would construct an alliance inside the Congress, a difficult task to carry out due to the 
unprecedented division of power in the lower house. Certainly the real battles over Mexico's 
future are being fought not in the presidency but in the Chamber of Deputies. As a result the 
changes that Fox's administration had envisioned upon taking power have been difficult to 
accomplish. Ordinary laws, constitutional reforms and even the budget reforms, which in 
previous administrations were carried out passively, have become challenged affairs in 
Congress. In other words, the election of 2000 produced a weaker president who had to 
negotiate with a hostile chamber of deputies (Dresser, 2003). 
With the combination of PRI-PRD majority in the Chamber and Senate, President 
Fox certainly inherited conditions for a weaker presidency relative to the legislature than 
Mexico had ever seen. Thus, the probability of an executive-legislative impasse for Fox 
seemed high. As a result key initiatives were clearly blocked or delayed with apparently 
strategic moves from the opposition. A clear example of the hostile and frustrating situation 
was the rejection of Fox's initiatives to reform the fiscal and the energy sectors, as well as the 
negative response of constitutionally mandated travel requests by the president. Therefore the 
circumstances of a divided government in the first tree years of Fox's administration (2000-
2003) created an austere legislative perspective (Shrik, 2005). 
The frustration of President Fox, caused by the obstruction of Congress and his 
declining levels of support, led him to appeal directly to the public, bypassing Congress and 
blaming political parties for the administration's incompetence. Yet, in a country like Mexico 
with a newly born democracy, this lack of support for its practice and institutions had 
affected the path toward democratic governance (Mizrahi, 2003). 
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President Fox had carried out a different plan to govern in which surveys, data 
processing, image management and marketing were performed. Vicente Fox believed that the 
successful promotion of himself and his policies would lead to key legislative victories in the 
new divisions of power in the country; however, this new way of doing politics which would 
direct him to successful governance was difficult to negotiate, since the congress and 
institutions did not respond to the president's demands. The alternative of "going public" 
usually fits in consolidating democracies, something that Mexico does not have (Dresser, 
2003). 
In the first half of his administration, President Fox has little to show for its efforts. 
The economy has remained stable, however, with a low demand from the U. S . economy and 
with economic growth questionable and far from being a significant accomplishment. In 
addition unemployment and crime have increased, the cabinet has remained a source of a 
power struggle and incompetence rather than one of producing true results, and Fox's main 
initiatives in an attempt at reform have been rejected by the legislative power. Therefore the 
first three years were not easy for Fox's administration and the big expectations that had been 
generated during the campaign became an enormous disappointment for many Mexicans 
(Rubio, 2004). 
The midterm elections in 2003 were evidence of the people's disappointment. The 
Mexican electorate let Fox know of their irritation by not turning out to vote, since only 41 
percent of the registered voters participated. In addition Fox's party (PAN) lost 54 seats in 
the Congress, while PRI increased its delegation from 208 to 222. Meanwhile the PRD, 
which is considered the third political force in the country, a party driven by the charisma of 
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (former Mexico City major), went from 54 seats to 95. Thus, 
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President Fox at present has lost support for the important reforms that he claims the country 
needs (Preston and Dillon, 2004). 
The 2003 federal elections were seen as a referendum on the promises of the Fox 
administration to bring change to the country. This election also produced a record low for 
voter turnout in Mexican federal elections, and analysts rapidly proclaimed the event an 
enormous defeat for both President Fox and the PAN. Subsequently the Congress remained 
as divided opposition led by a recovering PRI and a rapidly rising PRD. The PRI also 
showed its recovery in the Congress, since it also won the governorships in Campeche, 
Colima, and the state of Mexico. Critics attributed PAN's defeat to the fractured Congress 
that banned the implementation of Fox's agenda, as well as the failures, mistakes, and 
setbacks in diverse policy areas of Fox's administration (Shrik, 2005). 
The Beginning of a New Era 
The PRI political party's presidents were the image of a symbiotic fusion of party and 
government, where political support was reached through preferential distribution of 
government resources throughout an enormous serpentine labyrinth of power. Moreover 
consistent legislative majorities were a key element to guarantee the longevity of the PRI 
machine. Therefore, Vicente Fox's inauguration was not just a change of power from one 
party to another, but a profound and dramatic transformation from the Mexico of the past to 
the Mexico of today. Before the year 2000 and the endless victories of the PRI, the structure 
of the system established was very clear, yet after Fox's election the country lost that 
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equilibrium and individual politicians and political parties were learning to maneuver in a 
new atmosphere (Shirk, 2005). 
The triumph of the PAN party in the presidential elections of 2000 represents a 
turning point in the country's political life, since the PRI was not just a political party: it was 
an essential part of Mexico's political regime. As an important vehicle for gaining and 
maintaining power, the PRI held a virtual monopoly which controlled the presidency since its 
creation several decades before. In addition the party controlled, until the mid 1980s, all state 
governments and the overwhelming majority of municipalities. Moreover the PRI controlled 
until 1997 an unchallenged majority in both chambers of congress. The new political era in 
which the country lives is characterized by plurality in government, effective separation of 
powers, a freer and more aggressive media and an entirely different profile in the 
composition of the executive cabinet (Mizrahi, 2003). 
In the past the PRI has operated under the simple formula of "loyalty and discipline in 
exchange for benefits." The PRI encouraged the development of multiple organizations 
which had a place inside the party, but appointments were made, of course, in exchange for 
party loyalty, thus creating a network which reached into all the areas of the economy and 
society to exercise political control. This network of controls became a primordial source of 
power for the president, who also was the party leader. However, when the link between the 
PRI and the presidency was broken with Vicente Fox's election, Mexico experienced a deep 
transformation that altered the country's entire political system (Rubio, 2004). 
Vicente Fox's victory eliminated three main conditions that had previously enabled 
Mexican presidentialism to exist and flourish -unified government, strong discipline with the 
majority party, and presidential leadership of the PRI. During the long p~iista reign, the 
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Mexican presidents set down different guidelines to govern based on singular national 
projects. Yet, they exercised enormous power with almost a nonexistent accountability, 
besides sharing a common purpose: to preserve the party (PRI) dominated system for flexible 
presidential intervention. After 2000, Mexico entered an era in which the imperial 
presidency, which accentuates the president's almost absolute power over the country, had 
ended and the informal presidency, which emphasizes the limited powers of the president, 
had begun. Today in Mexico the president is viewed as a temporary occupant of a position 
which can be won or lost at the polls, rather than as symbolic figure. Therefore the president, 
instead of establishing his irrevocable determination, has to negotiate in order to obtain 
support from below (Dresser, 2003). 
Mexico was not spared suffering a rough and somewhat painful transition to 
democracy since many of the key institutions of the society were slow to transform. Such 
institutions (congress, judicial system, state and local governments and political parties) were 
established in a system of firm hierarchical authority and now they were learning to function 
in a different manner, one more horizontal with dispersed political power. Other institutions 
such as the armed forces and the intelligence services are being forced to redefine their roles, 
since they were structured to reinforce and preserve an authoritarian state (Tulchin and Selee, 
2003). 
Once the presidency was separated from the PRI, the structure of power changed 
dramatically. Mexico's presidents became powerful not because of the rights granted to them 
by the constitution, but because of the network of controls reached by their connection to the 
PRI. Constitutionally the Mexican presidents are much weaker than any president in the 
hemisphere. After academic research comparing the power of the president in twenty three 
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countries, Mexico obtained a score of one in a scale from zero to six, where Brazil obtained 
four and United States a two. Therefore the power that once was concentrated in the 
presidency had moved to other elements of the government. Power was thus granted to the 
Congress which has become the center of political negotiations. However deputies (once in 
the past) accountable to the president are more independent today and are accountable to 
their party leaders, who exercise enormous influence in their future aspirations in politics. As 
a result deputies have no incentive to negotiate or even take notice of the president's 
constituents. Another element where the power departed from the president was the media. 
After years of self censorship, in exchange for benefits and privileges, the media (until 2000) 
was but a government instrument. Today the media has become a critical political antagonist 
that acts as unruly, inflexible and aggressive, sometimes pushing their own agendas and 
interests at the expense of the politicians. Nevertheless, a free and independent media 
remains preferable even though more controversial than previously. Power has also shifted to 
governors and some local leaders, since the structure of controls once used by the PRI to 
establish a strict discipline has been vanquished. Today in Mexico governors and municipal 
presidents are found brokers of a significant part of the political process often exercising 
influence over their state's representatives in Congress. Furthermore the budgets of many 
states and municipalities have been increased as the result of larger direct transfers from the 
federal budget without a means of making them accountable to a central authority for the use 
of these funds. Another critical player in the country's politics is the Supreme Court and the 
judiciary in general. This element has become a central arbiter of disputes in the political 
system after having obtained a new autonomy and power to review the constitutionality of 
laws. In addition the Supreme Court has played a key role in defining the restrictions of 
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presidential authority. Despite the presence of seemingly constant conflict in Mexican 
politics, it is important to reveal that most controversies and political disputes are being 
settled through the judiciary system (Rubio, 2004). 
Indeed, Vicente Fox's election brought about political change, an issue which was 
promoted so much in his campaign. This has become a change that many do not recognize or 
that many have misunderstood; however, there is no doubt that Mexico experienced a 
transformation after the year 2000. One aspect of the change can be seen in methodical 
adherence to democratic procedure, instead of the substantial frauds and resulting post-
election hangovers of the past. Another indication of change was the end of abuses of 
political monopoly and recognition of the spirit of challenge through political competition 
and cooperation. One more sign of change can be observed in the balance of the power in the 
three branches of government, the executive, the legislative and the judicial; as well in terms 
of accountability. This means that Mexican presidents and generally speaking all politicians 
have had to become more accountable for their actions or inactions in public office (Shirk, 
2005). 
During the long run of PRI rule, Mexico had become a country where corruption and 
complicity had dominated the political environment. Fox's victory entailed more than the 
rule of a different party and more than another step in Mexico's tortuous transition to 
democracy. Vicente Fox's victory represents the materialization of a profound change in 
Mexican politics. Today Mexico has a Congress that works a counterweight, a media that 
serves as a watchdog, and a civil society that demands more and accepts less from its elected 
representatives. Yet the country still needs to establish institutions and cultivate habits and 
attitudes that will allow democracy to grow and thus succeed and flourish. Mexico today 
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shows signs of a free and vibrant society; however, the will of the citizens has not yet 
completely been expressed by those elected to Congress. Indeed Mexico exhibits a relatively 
autonomous political society with elected officials not consistently in touch with the will of 
the people, yet it takes time for a new democratic order to mature and to succeed. Another 
important issue is the rule of law, which seems to be lacking in Mexico, yet there is a 
struggle underway to acquire it. With the intention to assure the rule of law to all citizens, 
Mexico has to deal with and remove the following impediments: a divided government, 
reduced presidential power in a former presidentialist regime, a party system in flux, political 
and economic decentralization, and the absence of an institutional framework that would be 
able to implement the rule of law (Dresser, 2003). 
INFONAVIT and SEG UR O POP ULAR 
Despite the severe disapproval from critics and a large segment of Mexicans due to 
the wide gap between campaign promises and the actions which took place in office, the Fox 
administration performed significant achievements that can be pointed out. Indeed, President 
Fox succeeded in two important areas to which the federal government in the past had not 
given adequate attention nor the required importance. Fox's administration carried out a 
substantial reform of the INFONAVIT (National Institute of Workers Housing) which was 
implemented to facilitate the acquisition of houses by workers using durable lending against 
their salary. Before the Vicente Fox presidential term INFONAVIT was paralyzed by 
corruption at every level, yet during the Fox administration the INFONAVIT became more 
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proficient, increasing the number of homes bought by workers and thus establishing a 
considerable achievement in this area in the history of the country. 
Certainly in the first four years with Fox in power (2000-2004), the federal 
government succeeded in conceding more than one million housing loans. To be precise, this 
sum was the same amount that was reached in the eight previous years. In addition for the 
first time in Mexico's history, the applicants with the lower incomes in the country received a 
subsidy from the federal government in order to facilitate the poorest families the opportunity 
of acquiring a house (Nino, 2005). 
By September 2005 the INFONAVIT reached the astonishing number of two million 
housing loans granted. The investment in the housing sector represented 500,000,000 pesos, 
and during the last five years, the grow of this industry has been, in average, 18% annually. 
The housing industry in Mexico represents an important segment of the country's economic 
development since it generates direct and indirect employment to three millions Mexicans, 
besides being related to thirty-seven branches of the national economy. In addition, housing, 
besides being an important factor of economic development, is a component marking 
progress for the Mexican families. This is reflected in the fact that more than 40% of the 
loans granted during Fox's administration have benefited families whose incomes fell in the 
bottom 25% of the country's wage earners. Indeed the support to the housing sector by the 
Fox administration has provided direct benefits to more than 9 million Mexicans since, 
besides the 2 million housing loans, the federal government has granted almost 1 million 
loans and subsidies for housing improvements (Milenio, 2005). 
The director of the INFONAVIT, Victor Manuel Borras Setien, who was designated 
by President Fox in the year 2000, established that the success of the institution during Fox's 
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administration is attributable to the operation of the new pattern of loans and to the 
coordination of lending with the developers, construction engineers, assessment entities, 
notaries and financial institutions (El Universal, 2005). 
Nevertheless, even though INFONAVIT is the organization that for a fifth 
consecutive year has allowed the housing industry to grow more than two digits, it still has 
some old bad habits, such as the delay in the granting of financing to the applicants, a 
situation that negatively affects companies that trade on the stock exchange. Borras Setien, 
who recognizes that the organization is not yet working at its best, declared that 
INFONAVIT suffers from defects such as the delay of up to six months in the granting of 
loans for the purchase of a traditional house, due to the fact that demand for loans surpasses 
the financial assets of the organization (Martinez, 2005). 
Another of the significant achievements of the Fox's administration was the creation 
of the national system of medical insurance covering families, called Segu~o Popular 
(People's Insurance). For a small fee calculated against their socio-economic situation, an 
entire family can be insured against common health problems and special events like 
pregnancies. After its recent creation the program was criticized since the program required a 
fee, even though all the government insurance systems require one. Another criticism was 
that the insurance program covered a rather small number of health conditions. However, 
afterward, coverage was expanded to include cancer, HIV and cataracts for vulnerable groups 
such as children and senior citizens. Moreover, the program has expanded to all the states of 
the country. 
By the year 2004 more than 1.5 million families had registered in the Segu~o Popular. 
The new program consists basically of giving integral health services, such as external doctor 
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consultations, emergency medical care and hospitalization, to all the population that lack 
these benefits. The Segu~o Popular is focused in the part of the population that has not a 
formal job, thus leaving them out of existing governmental health programs. This (neglected) 
segment of the population is basically the self-employed, the unemployed and part-time 
workers (Nino, 2005). 
The improvement in the health sector, evident through efforts by the Fox 
administration, was considered to be important achievement while forgotten or nonexistent in 
other administrations. Indeed Mexico's health coverage system has increased greatly in the 
last five years. While it has not accomplished maximum or hoped-for standards, the 
population's more vulnerable segment at present has access to more health care services than 
ever before, and Mexicans are thus enj Dying a better quality of life. Health services have 
been through the years a serious problem for a significant part of Mexican society without 
IMSS (Mexican Institute of Social Security) or ISSSTE (Institute of Security and Social 
Services of the Workers), which are the main institutions of social security in Mexico. These 
institutions protect only 55% of the population, while around 45 million Mexicans who 
belong to the impoverished strata do not have health care services. In order to strengthen 
their political posture in this matter, the federal government decided to push reforms to the 
General Law of Health in 2003 and 2004; however, after the reforms were implemented, 
there emerged a string of questions regarding the supposed intent of privatizing these 
services. Nevertheless, Secretary of Health Julio Frenk established that the reform addressed 
three main problems that the health system faced. These included a change in the 
population's epidemic profile, potent technologies for the control of the illnesses, and a 
population more conscious and more demanding in the matter of health rights of citizens. At 
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the present the Seguro Popular works in the whole country and protects more than 2.5 
million families, even in Mexico City, where the agreement was signed until August 2005 
(Mexico City Mayor Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador had refused to sign the agreement due to 
the then political conflict with President Fox). The Seguro Popular is provided in 1,800 
clinics and hospitals and it is expected that by 2010 it will cover 5 million families, or 
approximately 20 million Mexicans (Gonzalez, 2005). 
Furthermore the Seguro Popular will be extended to undocumented migrants working 
in the United States. Meant as a move to improve both health care and relations with the 
United States, the Fox administration is unveiling an extension of Seguro Popular in the 
United States, thus offering many Mexicans who do not have medical coverage an 
unprecedented access to treatment back home. It is expected that by 2005, 400,000 migrants 
would be eligible for the Seguro Popular extension which would be launched in the state and 
city of Zacatecas, which is known for its high number of migrants in the United States. 
Undocumented migrants can find medical care at United States emergency rooms; however, 
those facilities cannot address chronic or complicated conditions. Those from Mexico 
currently can get treatment back home but have a hard time making their way through that 
nation's labyrinth of health care bureaucracy. Under Seguro Popular, migrants will be able to 
obtain immediate attention and low-cost care. The extension of the Seguro Popular is the 
first step toward a more sophisticated system, since enough funds should be available to 
people with severe medical conditions. And ideally, the program will provide an incentive to 
work out agreements with U. S . insurance companies so migrants can acquire immediate 
access to basic medical services in the United States (Rozemberg, 2005). 
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Presidential Succession 
Regrettably Mexico's profound transformation was not sufficient to declare that the 
country had accomplished democratic governance. Indeed Mexico does not have any path to 
guide politicians, neither a process to prevent the new legislative-executive tension. For 
example in countries such as Spain and Chile, which in recent times experienced vast 
changes achieving democracy, the outgoing government designed a course of action and 
developed institutions for the emerging democratic system. Yet, even after the discrete 
political adjustment of Salinas and Zedillo's 1996 electoral reform, in Mexico there does not 
exist a system of transition for the institutional structure. Certainly in Mexico there is no 
incentive for members of Congress to renovate by any means the old institutions; possibly it 
would take another six years of non-PRI rule for this to begin to change (Rubio, 2004). 
Nevertheless democracy does not assure an exceptional government; democracy after 
all, is a set of rules and a culture that serves to choose political leaders and permits citizens to 
limit misgovernment. Building a democracy is not easy task; it is a work in progress, in many 
countries it had taken decades. Mexico in reality has been building its democracy for scarcely 
three decades and is still working on it. Indeed Mexico is a country which today maintains an 
effective division of powers and awell-tested electoral system; besides it has achieved 
complete liberty of expression. However the country unquestionably embraces moments of 
turbulence directing a drama in which the President, the newly independent Congress and 
political leaders are the main actors (Preston and Dillon, 2004). The PRI, led by Roberto 
Madrazo Pintado, its national Leader; the PRD, led by Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, 
Mexico City mayor; and the PAN already in the presidential chair, have unleashed a severe 
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political struggle for a distant 2006 presidential succession in which the landscape seems 
surprisingly uncertain due to a string of attacks in all directions among the three main 
political forces in the country. 
Roberto Madrazo, a lawyer graduated from the UNAM and whose father was a 
populist governor of the state of Tabasco in the late 1950s, became an active PRI member 
when a teenager. He rapidly "climbed the ladder" to become senator as well as president of 
the Tabasco state party, thus building his followers among the state's truck farmers, oilmen 
and ranchers. During that period Madrazo was a supporter of President Salinas and his 
economic modernization, but when Salinas fell into scandal, Madrazo shifted quickly and 
attacked the federal government. Madrazo developed into the figure of a cacique (local 
political leader, which combines repression, patronage, and charismatic leadership) and in 
1994 won the election of governor of Tabasco after laying out enormous amounts of money, 
buying up media time and paying journalists, in addition to carrying out an electoral fraud. 
Madrazo's term as governor was characterized by his populist style of governing in which he 
ruled his party and state at the same time. By the year 2000 Madrazo had lost the PRI's 
primary election for the presidential candidacy against Francisco Labastida, after spending 
millions of Tabasco's state funds supposedly to promote the state's image but in reality 
promoting himself. By 2001 ~ Madrazo was elected the national president of the PRI which 
had experienced an extraordinary recovery winning several state elections after the 
substantial defeat in the 2000 presidential election (Preston and Dillon, 2004). 
Indeed Roberto Madrazo is one of the main characters of the recent scandals that have 
shaken the national politics of Mexico. Since President Fox's term began, the figure of 
Madrazo has appeared in the most important political events, such as the scandal in the 
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elections of Tabasco in the late 2001. The clear fraud carried out by the PRI, was made under 
Fox indulgence, since the President did not accommodate the requests that made their own 
people of Tabasco to politically impede the advance of the PRI mad~acista that acts as the 
mafia. Later Madrazo "seized" the national leadership of the PRI, and already as national 
president of the party, committed with Vicente Fox to support the important structural 
reforms (fiscal, energetic and labor) that the country needed and approved them in the 
Chamber of Deputies. Madrazo gave his word and, through Elba Esther Gordillo, then 
coordinator of the PRI in the Chamber of Deputies, participated in the negotiations among 
government and the other parties, the leaders of the oil and electrical unions, as well the labor 
sector. However Madrazo suddenly changed his mind and the reforms were revoked; thus 
Madrazo betrayed his own word, let the unpopular reaction be directed to Fox and Gordillo, 
and until much later appeared in the political scenario to begin a new adventure; this time 
against Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (Olmos, 2005). 
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, also a populist and even more talented as a grassroots 
organizer, was Madrazo's most formidable rival in Tabasco politics. Lopez Obrador had 
started in the Tabasco PRI, yet not from a position of privilege as had been the case with 
Madrazo. In 1970 Lopez Obrador served as the State Director of Indian Affairs. By 1982 he 
was selected to direct the PRI gubernatorial campaign which soon took him to the state party 
leadership. By 1985 he left Tabasco for a position with a federal consumer rights agency in 
Mexico city; during that time his disappointment with his party (PRI) grew. By 1988 
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas disaffection with the PRI influenced Lopez Obrador, who after the 
electoral fraud that put Salinas in the presidency, organized a voters rights civil resistance 
movement, leading marches and blocking roads across Tabasco. Afterward Lopez Obrador 
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returned to Tabasco to contend for governor representing the Democratic Current (CD), 
Cardenas coalition. However, he lost the election against Roberto Madrazo by a margin of 
97,000 votes; although it was a wide margin, Lopez Obrador rejected the results arguing that 
Madrazo had surpassed the campaigns finance limits besides carrying out electoral fraud. In 
protest Lopez Obrador's followers seized dozens of Tabasco PEMEX facilities, partially 
paralyzing the huge oil production in that state. However Madrazo remained f~firmly in charge 
in Tabasco; meanwhile Lopez Obrador became a national opposition leader of the system 
after a running battle against Madrazo and the PRI as well as heading the new dissenting 
wing of the PRI led by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas a few years before, known as the PRD. By 
2000 Lopez Obrador was elected mayor of Mexico City (the second most important elected 
office in the country) after carrying out a campaign focused on the urban poor. As mayor of 
Mexico City, Lopez Obrador governed as an articulate populist who frequently challenged 
President Fox and soon he (Lopez Obrador) became Fox's most powerful rival (Preston and 
Dillon, 2004). 
Lopez Obrador as mayor of Mexico City has faced several polemic situations in his 
administration. In September 2003 he received the order by a judge to pay 1,810,000 pesos of 
indemnity in the case of the Paraje San Juan. Three months later Lopez Obrador faced the 
"nicogate " which involved his personal driver Nicolas Mollinedo and his excessive salary, 
by pay standards in Mexico, of more than six thousand dollars per month. Lopez Obrador 
was barely recovering from the "nicogate " when a string of video tapes, called 
"videoescandalos ", shocked the entire country. One of those videos showed Mexico City's 
Minister of Finances, Gustavo Ponce, gambling large amounts of money in Las Vegas and 
another one evidenced Rene Bej arano, local deputy of the PRD, receiving wads of cash from 
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businessman Carlos Ahumada and putting the money in a portfolio and in his jacket pockets. 
One month later the Attorney General Rafael Macedo de la Concha announced the solicitude 
of the Chamber of Deputies regarding the lawsuit of desafue~o (fact that deprives the 
constitutional protection against being subjected to judicial process) against Lopez Obrador 
for accusations of disobeying a judicial order, which asked Lopez Obrador to cancel the 
construction of a street in the property of E1 Encino. The lawsuit of desafue~o would 
disqualify Lopez Obrador from the race for the presidency in 2006 in which he would seem 
to be the favorite by more than ten points in recent surveys. Members and supporters of the 
PRD claim that the series of attacks are part of a solid campaign against Lopez Obrador in an 
effort to discredit his administration and to test his "enormous" popularity. This has raised 
the whole party (PRD) against Fox, whom they hold responsible for what they think is 
wielding the law for political ends (Cancino, 2004). 
Yet once more Madrazo appeared on the scene heading the campaign of desafue~o 
against Lopez Obrador through the faction of the PRI in the Chamber of Deputies, 
coordinated by Emilio Chuayffet Chemor. On this occasion using a form of "double talk" 
saying that he would like to see Lopez Obrador in the competition for the Presidency of the 
2006, while in private he organized the strategy to support the elimination of his main 
opponent. Thus by April 2005 Madrazo has advanced his intentions, since the Chamber of 
Deputies removed Lopez Obrador's constitutional protection; an event that abroad was called 
a setback for the weak Mexican democracy. Again Madrazo let Fox pay the consequences of 
the enormous national and international scandal that had caused the law suit (Olmos, 2005). 
However the legal proceedings that threatened to force Mexico into turmoil seemed to 
come to an end when President Vicente Fox announced the resignation of his attorney 
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general and a review of the government's case against Lopez Obrador. Twenty days after the 
Chamber of Deputies removed Lopez Obrador's constitutional protection, in a nationally 
televised address, President Fox established that he had accepted the resignation of Attorney 
General Rafael Macedo de la Concha, who directed the prosecution of the politician, Lopez 
Obrador. Macedo de la Concha was considered a conservative brigadier general who had 
been credited with dismantling some of the most prevailing drug cartels, but also criticized 
for using his office to intimidate President Fox's political opponents. Macedo de la Concha's 
resignation was widely considered a kind of peace offering to Lopez Obrador. Yet President 
Fox in a speech stressed that defending democracy was his government's most important 
responsibility, and wanted to guarantee that next year's presidential elections would be fair, 
transparent and open to all qualified figures (Thompson, 2005). 
Indeed President Fox delivered one of the most important speeches of his presidency 
when he addressed the nation establishing that Mexico City's mayor Lopez Obrador would 
not be excluded from the presidential race by an unconvincing legal move. Certainly by 
doing that, President Fox acted like the leader of a real democracy, since before Fox took 
action, it was established that Lopez Obrador would not be the candidate of the leftist party 
in the presidential elections of 2006. However at the present Lopez Obrador would be able to 
contend against the PRI and President Fox's party, the PAN. The decision made by President 
Fox was too long in coming, yet a vital one, since the Mexican democracy could have been 
damaged severely. President Fox was correct in avoiding the old way of doing business in 
Mexico, the "taking out" of a major political opponent (New York Times, 2005). 
Nevertheless the rectification of the federal government in not prosecuting Lopez 
Obrador took Roberto Madrazo unawares, since he was to be the main beneficiary of the 
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exclusion of Lopez Obrador. Madrazo and the PRI erupted in irritation and accused Fox of 
"inconsistency", since the PRI with Lopez Obrador out of the race, was freely heading for 
victory in the elections of 2006. Thus the deterioration strayed toward Madrazo and toward 
the PRI which was exposed as the true instigator of the desafue~o (Olmos, 2005). 
At the present Mexico's three main political forces are moving towards carrying out 
their respective primary elections in which the three parties are significantly divided. The 
PRI embraces two blocs, the TUCOM (All United Against Madrazo) which is constituted by 
several PRI governors, as well as PRI deputies and senators, and is represented by Arturo 
Montiel Rojas, Governor of the State of Mexico; and the bloc of Madrazo which is 
considered the strongest one (on October 2005 Montiel Rojas renounced to his pre-
candidacy, apparently after being accused of corruption). In the PRD the division exists 
among Lopez Obrador's group that is the great majority and the so-called group of Extreme 
Leftists with few possibilities of giving a fair struggle against Lopez Obrador. And lastly the 
PAN in which Felipe Calderon Hinojosa, former Secretary of Energy who broke with the 
federal government in 2004 and who leads the surveys, and Santiago Creel Miranda, former 
Secretary of Interior, representing the two groups inside the PAN at a time in which President 
Fox has tried to remain neutral. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
One must be discrete in attempting to draw definitive conclusions from this study and 
analysis of the terms of office of three Mexican president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari (PRI 
1988-1994), Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon (PRI 1994-2000) and Vicente Fox Quesada 
(PAN 2000-2006). Nevertheless I found remarkable circumstances in examining the three 
periods that are worthy of discussion. 
First of all, it is important to mention the political backgrounds of the three 
presidents. Both Carlos Salinas and Ernesto Zedillo were the products of the Mexican 
welfare state's meritocracy, which flourished during the vast part of the 60's and 70's in 
Mexico. Both did their undergraduate studies in Mexican public universities and later went 
abroad using government resources to obtain graduate degrees (Master's and Ph.D.). Vicente 
Fox completed only an undergraduate business administration degree in a Mexican private 
university, and later acquired a diploma from a short course in a university abroad. Also, 
after graduating from their respective universities, Salinas and Zedillo were influenced by 
political mentors as they started careers in the federal bureaucracy. At the same time they 
were affiliated with the PRI, since both party and government were fused; while, by contrast, 
Fox did not plan to be a bureaucrat, and after graduation worked for fifteen years in a private 
company. 
Whereas Salinas and Zedillo were climbing the political ladder through positions in 
the federal government toward the top of the complex government hierarchy in which the 
influences and loyalties were extremely important, Fox left his current job in the private 
company and went to manage his family businesses in Guanajuato, becoming an 
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entrepreneur, and much later got involved into politics. Indeed Salinas and Zedillo occupied 
different positions in the federal government before becoming presidential candidates of their 
party; however they had never run for public office before, whereas Fox, before becoming 
the PAN's presidential candidate in 2000, had run once for federal deputy, and twice for 
Governor of Guanajuato. 
Considering that Salinas was selected as his party's next presidential candidate by his 
predecessor (President) Miguel de la Madrid in 1987, taking advantage of the preferential 
treatment to sink the hopes of the other possible candidates of the PRI, and in the process 
leaving the party completely fractured: in a similar manner, Zedillo (in 1993) was chosen to 
carry his party's banner by Salinas after the assassination of Colosio (PRI's presidential 
candidate) creating enormous internal problems within the PRI. Certainly Salinas had not 
been thinking of Zedillo as his predecessor, however, due to the pressing circumstances 
created by the assassination and due to the fact that there was not another member of the PRI 
with the technocrat profile. Also, pressure was being exerted by PRI's "old guard" and 
Salinas was compelled to make a decision and thus declared Zedillo as the PRI's presidential 
candidate. Nevertheless, while the Salinas and Zedillo's candidacies came about through 
different circumstances, both were selected by an incumbent president and not by party vote 
and democratic practices. Fox's nomination for the presidency took place three years before 
the election, and, although a large segment of his party showed dissent, Fox rapidly rose to 
prominence on the national scene in Mexico and became a very popular aspirant who did not 
have any prominent PAN candidate in position to challenge him. 
The circumstances in which these three presidents positioned themselves for the 
presidency were given in different situations. The election that brought Salinas to the 
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presidency was clearly fraudulent, since in the mid 80s the PRI's overwhelming dominance 
over the political system began to diminish, and for the first time in Mexican history the PRI 
faced enormous challenges and possibility of defeat. In 1993 although the country was in a 
period of political violence and some international observers reported several deficiencies, 
the election that brought Zedillo to power was quite clean, a result of the evident reform of 
state carried out by Salinas administration (even though Salinas himself became president 
through a fraudulent election, as a result of this fraud he was forced by the public opinion to 
carry out reforms to assure the legitimacy of future elections) which built and strengthened 
PRI's popularity. On the other hand the election that brought Fox to the presidency was 
different from all preceding elections in which stands out the fact that a now totally 
independent institution (the Federal Electoral Institute) was in charge, thus concluding a 
process of political reforms that had been building for fifteen years. 
Even though Salinas took power in the middle of a controversy caused by the 
electoral fraud in the 1988 presidential elections, he succeeded in settling down an angry 
opposition (PRD and PAN) which had launched significant challenges to the PRI's 
hegemony. A part of the strategy was to carry out a discreet electoral reform and to yield 
power to the opposition in some states. It was in the hands of the PAN that the PRI lost its 
first state (Baja California Norte) in 1989, thus achieving a significant break with the past, 
since this state had its first opposition party governor in more than sixty years. Following 
that, in 1991 Salinas intervened in Guanajuato and San Luis Potosi forcing his own party's 
standard bearers, PRI governor candidates, to resign after receiving accusations of fraud and 
paving the way for an opposition party governor. By 1992 in Michoacan the PRD gave a fair 
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struggle to win the state but at the end the victory was not recognized by Salinas; nonetheless 
in the same year the PAN won another state, this time Chihuahua. 
These efforts and achievements in election reform allowed Salinas to proclaim a 
truly open democracy in Mexico; however, the country was probably not quite ready for the 
democratic process. Since the old way, an antidemocratic pattern (some democracy tainted 
by local fraud and continued unethical influence on elections from the president in power) 
remained in Mexico's political environment. For example, examination of three democratic 
events in Zedillo's and Fox's administrations show a significant exacerbation in Mexico's 
antidemocratic pattern. These events were as follows: l.- President Zedillo put an end to the 
use of the PRI's most powerful principle, "el dedazo " (presidential appointment of the 
party's next nominee), when in 1999 he announced for the first time the implementation of a 
primary election to elect the PRI's presidential candidate, thus opening the country to a new 
road to democracy. 2. -President Zedillo accepted the results and stepped aside, after the 2000 
irreversible victory of Vicente Fox, candidate of the opposition, thus directing the country 
toward the sphere of democratic politics and ending 71 years of rule of PRI. Undeniably with 
this event President Zedillo was credited with this progress and noted in history as the leader 
who facilitated the transition to the full democracy through a peaceful process. 3.-President 
Fox left behind the old antidemocratic way of doing politics in Mexico when he announced 
the resignation of his attorney general and a review of the government's case against Andres 
Manuel Lopez Obrador. By doing that, President Fox strengthened a Mexican democracy 
that had been weakened by the removal of the constitutional protection (for disobeying a 
judicial order) of Lopez Obrador and disqualifying him from the race for the presidency in 
2006 in which he at the time was leading the polls by a wide margin. 
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A significant feature of the Salinas administration was the creation of PRONASOL 
(National Solidarity Program) and PECE (Pact for Economic Stability and Growth). With 
PRONASOL Salinas was able to reconstruct the patronage machine already rendered 
obsolete in its use by the priista (PRI member) old guard, and at the same time created a 
functional instrument for development. Besides reforming the PRI through PRONASOL, 
Salinas also built enormous support to his administration from low-income urban slums and 
rural Mexico: the result was political stability and an electoral victory in the midterm 
elections of 1991 recovering the majority in the congress which had been lost in 1988. Even 
though knowing that Salinas successful program contained massive political ends, as well as 
populist and paternalist tendencies, it is evident that thousands of Mexican families of low-
income benefited from PRONASOL, thus improving their quality of life. On the other hand 
PECE whose main purpose was to bring inflation under control and in turn stimulate the 
economy, stands out in the Salinas administration record, since inflation was reduced 
significantly and economic growth became evident. In the f~first years of Salinas rule the 
Mexican economy grew for the f~first time since the late 1970s. 
The success of PRONASOL and PECE is comparable with the considerable 
achievements in the creation of Seguro Popular (national system of medical insurance 
covering families) and the signif~scant reform of the INFONAVIT (National Institute of 
Workers Housing) carried out by Fox's administration. Like PRONASOL, Seguro Popular 
has been a target of the critics as being a program with populist and paternalist tendencies, as 
well as being an attempt to privatize the health sector in Mexico. However it was evident that 
many Mexicans had improved their living conditions, since the population's more vulnerable 
impoverished segments have been benefited by the innovative program of health care. On the 
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other hand, previous to the Vicente Fox presidential term, INFONAVIT was paralyzed by 
corruption at all levels and this situation had largely affected the progress of this essential 
area for the social development. The Fox administration addressed one of the sectors, 
housing, which had not been given adequate attention by other administrations. Proof of that 
was that by 2005 the federal government awarded through INFONAVIT more than 2 million 
housing loans. In addition the housing industry in Mexico represents an important segment of 
the country's economic development, since this industry generates employment and is related 
to several agencies of the national economy, thus with coordination has power to stimulate 
significantly the Mexican economy. 
On the subject of successful programs and economic development, it is important to 
point out the remarkable economic recovery carried out in Zedillo's administration after the 
devastating financial crisis of 1994. Certainly Mexico overcame the 1994 financial crisis 
more rapidly than expected due to the success in reordering its public finances, in stabilizing 
its economy and increasing its economic growth. The evidence of progress was reflected by 
successful export performance in which the Maquilado~a (assembly plant) industry became 
an important economic force in Mexico. Increasing foreign trade allowed the Mexican 
economy to enter in highly competitive international markets. From the hand of NAFTA, 
which was projected by Salinas administration but did not yield results until the second half 
of Zedillo's administration, Mexico improved its export value of sales from $24 billion in 
1982 to almost $100 billion in 1996. These numbers placed Mexico in the top ten leading 
export countries in the world and at the same time economic stimulus was reflected in the 
creation of employment and an average annual growth rate of 5 percent. 
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Although NAFTA provided positive results in the second half of the Zedillo 
administration due to the efficient management of the economy, it is significant to declare 
that the negotiation of NAFTA was a great accomplishment of the Salinas administration. 
President Salinas succeeded through NAFTA in reinforcing Mexico's capacity to compete in 
the world market. Certainly NAFTA unified three countries (Canada, Mexico and United 
States) in a huge economic market. Under Salinas leadership, the PRI abandoned its 
revolutionary nationalist triumphs and ideology (a clear example of that was the dissolution 
of the original ejido system which was the distribution of land by the government to peasant 
farmers, and the recognition of the Church by the state, both by removing important clauses 
of the Mexican constitution) and relinquished its protectionist economic development model 
in exchange for the policy of free trade. These economic liberalization policies led the 
country to an unquestionable economic growth, and Salinas was seen as the leading figure 
and force in a sweeping neo-liberal economic reform. Thus, Salinas improved the 
relationship between the private sector and the state and established a policy that integrated 
many ingredients of international economic liberalism including a vast program of 
privatization. Large numbers of state enterprises were sold: the quantity of these was reduced 
from 1,555 in 1982 to only 217 in 1992. President Salinas transformed the Mexican economy 
into a model of private enterprise, in which the center of the whole project was foreign 
investment and privatization. Certainly for the first time in years Mexico had accomplished 
economic growth and economic stability because of modifications that Salinas and his group 
of technocrats had carried out. 
However the new economic plan could not avoid the catastrophic and surprising crisis 
of December 1994, better known as "The Error of December", that occurred just days after 
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President Zedillo took office. Both administrations (Salinas and Zedillo's) are to blame for 
the financial crisis. Yet, the reality was that neglect, arrogance and the lack of timely 
decisions by both administrations led to the deep financial crisis which meant a contraction 
of the Mexican economy of 6.2 percent (the largest decline since the year 1932). During the 
entire Salinas presidency, economic specialists had warned of a financial crisis and criticized 
the economic policy of President Salinas; yet despite the advice, his economic policy 
remained, leaving the country in a high risk of an economic disaster. Besides by 1994 the 
country lived moments of political tension caused by a string of political assassinations in 
which the PRI was the object of hard questions, causing political instability that in turn 
produced uncertainty in the markets. In addition the friction with the guerilla group EZLN 
and the inefficient management of the situation by Zedillo's administration resulted in 
significant disruption of the economy in which both the Mexican peso and reserve index 
plunged. The immediate consequences of the financial crisis were reflected in the severely 
damaged patrimony of many Mexicans. 
Both the Salinas and the Zedillo administrations by taking essential measures could 
have avoided the severe economic crisis which also affected severely the susceptible 
Mexican financial sector. After the "Error of December" many borrowers were obligated to 
decrease their payment obligations or in many cases stop paying, thus generating the largest 
debt portfolio in the history of the country. In addition debtors received the impact of the new 
load of interest added to their obligations and found their debts virtually impossible to pay. 
Consequently groups such as El Barton (an alliance of farmers and ranchers from northern 
Mexico and middle class home owners) emerged, demanding banks and government provide 
debt relief programs. Whereas the banks had an enormous debt to pay and at the same time 
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its collection was almost inexistent, the bank system found itself in a precarious situation. As 
a reaction to the dramatic collapse of the banking system, Zedillo's administration rapidly 
attacked the financial crisis establishing (through FOBAPROA) supporting programs. 
However an enormous controversy emerged after FOBAPROA absorbed most of the bad 
loans which came from banks and corporations related to Salinas and Zedillo's 
administrations, since some of the money involved was used to finance PRI's elections 
campaigns. The massive cost of the debt was to be absorbed into the public debt which cost 
Mexico around 1 S percent of its GDP. President Zedillo had to struggle for the rest of his 
term with a broken financial system, since it took more than four years to overcome the 
banking crisis. In addition, Zedillo's administration faced severe attacks because of the 
FOBAPROA disagreement, since many Mexicans refused to accept the rescue of bankers, 
corporations and individuals from precarious loans, loans that they should never have made. 
The "Error of December" which unleashed the break of the bank system and that in 
turn generated the controversial situation of the FOBAPROA, caused an enormous 
dissatisfaction for millions of Mexicans who had previously believed that finally the country 
had entered into "the f~first world." Indeed, Mexicans accept as true that the new economic 
model (in which progress was evident) would vault the Mexican economy into the category 
of one of world's leading economic forces. However, what seemed to be a promising 
economic model became controversial. The immense frustration felt in the first half of 
Zedillo's administration was similar to the enormous disappointment that occurred in the first 
half of Fox's administration. Although the causes were different, the intensity of the 
dissatisfaction with the federal government was equivalent. 
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The new era of "change" that Vicente Fox claimed to have brought to the country 
proved to be more complicated and challenging than many had expected. Indeed Vicente Fox 
raised enormous expectations for change and Mexicans gave Fox their vote in exchange for 
assurances of immediate results. Mexicans believed that a new leader from a different 
political party, not the PRI, to the presidency would transform automatically the entire 
country. Initially President Fox assembled a complex coalition (mainly composed of a group 
that did not want another PRI president, with contradictory priorities and agendas) with its 
sole objective to win the presidency. The result of the diversity of opinion among coalition 
members created a lack of cooperation within the federal government which damaged the 
governing capacity and at the same time deteriorated the PAN's ideological profile. On the 
other hand the wide gap between campaign promises and actual accomplishments in office 
was the result of severe disapproval from the public. Indeed President Fox's vision presented 
more vague promises, rather than specific policy obj ectives. A clear example of that were the 
promises of resolving the situation of Chiapas indigenous insurrection in "fifteen minutes", 
and the accomplishment of a gross domestic product growth rate over 7 percent annually, 
neither of which has been achieved. Another issue that severely affected President Fox's 
image was his failure in carrying out the important structural reforms (fiscal, energy, and 
labor) that the country needed. Although it is evident that an unprecedented division of 
power in the legislature blocked or delayed key initiatives further hindered by apparently 
strategic moves from the opposition, Fox's administration could not construct through 
negotiation the necessary powerful alliance inside the Congress. Therefore the first three 
years were not easy for the Fox administration. Mexicans had placed their hopes and 
optimism in the new President; however the results, did not come fast enough to suit the 
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electorate. The midterm elections in 2003 were evidence of the disappointed people, since 
only 41 percent of the registered voters participated. In addition, Mexicans let Fox know of 
their irritation by punishing him and his party, since the PAN lost 54 seats in the Congress. In 
addition it was not close to winning any state election and analysts proclaimed the event an 
enormous defeat for both, President Fox and the PAN. 
Despite the enormous disaffection of all Mexicans after the first half of Fox's 
administration, it would be correct to declare that Mexico experienced, after the year 2000, a 
deep transformation which many do not recognize or that many have misunderstood. The 
new political era which began with Fox's election and the severing of the link between the 
PRI and the presidency spelled change in the entire Mexican political scene. Thus the era of 
the imperial presidency, which accentuates the president's absolute power over the country 
had ended. Indeed, Vicente Fox's election eliminated conditions such as unified government, 
a single dominant majority party, and presidential leadership of the PRI that had enabled 
"presidentialism" to exist. Today the power that once was concentrated in the presidency has 
moved to other elements of the government such as the Congress, which has become the 
center of political negotiations. More independent expression also has been displaced to the 
media which (until 2000) was but a government instrument. Today the Mexican media has 
become a critical political protagonist. Power has also shifted to governors and local leaders 
who have become brokers of a significant part of the political process, since they are now 
autonomous from the PRI control. Another critical player in the country's politics is the 
Supreme Court, which was almost nonexistent in previous decades. Certainly the Supreme 
Court has become a central arbiter of disputes in the political system after having obtained a 
new independence to review the constitutionality of laws. Other aspects that represent a 
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change in the Mexican political system are the methodical adherence to democratic 
procedure, the end of abuses of political monopoly, a balance of power in the three branches 
of government (executive, legislative, and judicial) and a better of accountability in and 
among the different government agencies. 
After a previous long political history marked by bloody battles and corruption, 
Mexicans have finally experienced a peaceful transition of power: one that many did not 
notice, since the change was achieved in an efficient and peaceful way. On the historic day of 
July 2nd of 2000 not only did Vicente Fox and a different political party triumph; on this day 
there was victory for every Mexican in favor of democracy. Today Mexico has a civil society 
that demands more and tolerates less from their elected representatives; such civil society has 
demonstrated a new perception of political culture able to transform the path of the country. 
Yet Mexicans have to establish institutions and cultivate habits and attitudes that will allow 
democracy to grow. Once democracy became a fact of life in the nation, Mexicans have had 
to deal with establishing the rule of law. In order to achieve the rule of law, the Mexican 
people have to struggle with several impediments such as a divided government, political and 
economic decentralization, the absence of an institutional framework and reduction of 
presidential power. 
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APPENDIX A: BASTA 
In the first hours of the year 1994, when the celebration of another successful year of 
neo-liberalism in Mexico was finishing, all cautious Mexicans found out that an insurgency 
movement had began in the state of Chiapas. The timing was not an accident: the insurgency 
movement was launched in sequence to make a political proclamation the same day that 
NAFTA went into effect. Armed indigenous fighters from the mountains of Chiapas moved 
down to the cities and declared war on Mexico's criminal government, making it the most 
recent movement in a long history of rebellions by a people demanding basic human dignity 
and privileges. The frustrated peasants confined and occupied San Cristobal de las Casas and 
three other major towns. The Mexican army responded aggressively, resulting in more than 
145 deaths and estimates of the wounded numbering in the hundreds. 
The Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN), as they were called, took its name 
from Emiliano Zapata, a famous champion of indigenous rights in the Mexican Revolution. 
The Zapatistas, as they called themselves, did not act like most other guerilla groups. They 
were not interested in seizing state power nor did their revolt take on ethnic themes. Instead 
they declared to be fighting for freedom, democracy and sovereignty. 
After twelve days of combat, national and international scrutiny caused the image 
alert Mexican government to call a cease fire; thus, the Zapatistas decided to call off their 
attacks and instead go into negotiations with the government. The conflict is still unresolved. 
The outcome of the conflict may well determine if this is the beginning of a grassroots 
movement to verify the growing power of global capitalism. In their moral dispute with neo-
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liberalism, the new Zapatistas made claims that indigenous people were making all over 
Latin America. Their claims focused on injustices, which had been around for S00 years. 
President Salinas and his neo-liberal advance were characterized by reduced role of 
the government in economic and social policies, increasing domination of the free market, 
and privatization of public property and services. However, this modernization process did 
nothing but increase social class strife in Chiapas. The implementation of his policies led to 
record levels of impoverishment in the region. Salinas terminated all of the programs which 
had been put into place by previous PRI leaders in their attempts to limit discontent in 
Chiapas. Salinas eliminated the state-run agency established by President Echeverria. That 
agency had been in charge of the acquisition of coffee from small producers and had led to 
the disintegration of small scale coffee production between 1989 and 1993. Although corn 
growers were still receiving subsidies, they were receiving them at a steadily declining rate, 
because the Mexican government was preparing for the implementation of NAFTA which 
would tolerate the importation of cheap corn from the United States. 
The government's neo-liberal economic program, which included reduced subsidies 
for the small farmers and the free trade policy with the United States, was the main factor 
which had caused the rebellion to explode. 
The reduction of aid given to the small farmers and the competition of the cheap corn 
imported from the United States had caused a more severe crisis in the Indian communities 
subjugated by the events of the previous five hundred years. On the morning of January 1, 
1994 indigenous people descended from the mountains and under the First Declaration of the 
Lacandona Jungle, Subcomandante Marcos along with armed Indians, declared war on 
Mexico's illegitimate government, and announced ~ Ya Basta! (That's enough!) . These 
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modern rebels were inspired by the example of their rebellious ancestors and taking 
principles and even names of Mexican revolutionaries. The EZLN sees NAFTA as the death 
sentence for Mexico's Indian peoples. NAFTA removed the trade obstacles between the 
U. S ., Canada and Mexico allowing the workforce to compete on a level playing field. This 
does not, however, work in the favor of poor Mexicans, the Mexican farmers who have 
neither the technology nor the fertile ground to compete with American farmers. 
The struggle in Chiapas persists; the latest in a long line of resistance against the 
control of native resources by outside interests supported by Northern capital and the local 
ruling elite. The world continues to watch the situation with great interest. It is a fight, not for 
control of a country or people, but rather a position for human rights and dignity of each 
individual. The question remains if this rebellion will result in the conversion of society from 
the bottom up or will continue with the present state of repression and exploitation by the 
global elite. The Zapatista's originally began as a group committed ~to self defense. Over the 
years other political structures had been tried -and failed. In the years before the EZLN 
formed, several efforts to reduce aid to the poor in the Lacandon Jungle had been 
implemented. In the face of the "inevitability of globalization," the Zapatistas have been able 
to bring about an effective critique of neo-liberalism and help to promote worldwide 
resistance against it. 
110 
APPENDIX B : THREE ASSASSINATIONS 
Three tragic assassinations had occurred in Mexico in less than one year. The possible 
links between organized crime, in particular drug trafficking and corruption, and political 
activity in Mexico might be evident. The first assassination attempt occurred in 
Guadalajara's airport. Juan Jesus Cardinal, Posadas Archbishop of Guadalajara, was 
assassinated point-blank inside his car. Months later the second occurred in Tijuana. Luis 
Donaldo Colosio Murrieta, former presidential candidate of the PRI for the 1994 elections, 
was killed during a campaign meeting. Six months later in Mexico City the third occurred. 
This time it was the turn of Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu former national leader of the PRI. 
Cardinal Jesus Posadas Ocampo was assassinated on May 24, 1993. The Cardinal was 
arriving at the Guadalajara airport and was about to get out of his car when an armed man 
forced open the door and shot him. At the time, he was wearing full church dress and a large 
cross on his chest, which did not protect him from being killed at point-blank range. His 
assassination was the f~first of many assassinations and his murder shocked the country and 
produced a debate linking security forces with organized crime (Guillermoprieto, 1995). 
It was reported that the cardinal was killed because he was mistaken for a drug 
kingpin, but some government circles believed that the murder was a warning from the mafia 
to avoid breaking the "traditional understanding" that existed between the security forces and 
drug traff~ickers. Another rumor was that the Cardinal had copies of documents that were 
taken from the office of Justo Ceja, a secretary of Carlos Salinas that linked the Salinas 
family to the drug cartels (Curzio, 2000). 
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After Cardinal's assassination prosecutors concluded that the men who shot him were 
paid by Ramon and Benjamin Arellano Felix, drug traffickers who mistook Posadas for 
Joaquin Guzman, also known as "El Chapo", and who was the mortal rival of Arellano. All 
the parties were at the airport and the gunmen summarily left the city on a commercial flight. 
The Mexican Church doubted this version of the crime and some of the people close to the 
Bishop's Conference mentioned that Posadas was prelate of Guadalajara and earlier of 
Tijuana, which were major drug trafficking centers, and they also pointed out the fact that he 
was vice-president of the Latin American Episcopal Conference, established in Bogota 
Colombia. According to Guillermoprieto they also mentioned that Posadas could have been 
an intermediary between the Salinas government and the Colombian drug trafficker Pablo 
Escobar. It was speculated that Posadas could have tried to make an offer between Escobar 
and Salinas by giving Salinas a list of Mexican officials that were involved in tfie drug trade 
in exchange for asylum. According to the church people the deal was refused b~T Salinas and 
Posadas was killed as an act of revenge (Guillermoprieto, 1995). 
Luis Donaldo Colosio, former presidential candidate of the PRI for the 1994 
elections, was killed on March 23, 1994, after walking away from the site of a campaign 
speech in Tijuana. Colosio was shot two times: one from the right, near the temple and 
another from the left, through the lower abdomen (Gullermoprieto, 1995). 
It is believed that Colosio was assassinated because his policies would have 
negatively affected the Gulf cartel, since one of his main intentions was to attack the 
principal Mexican drug cartels and investigate other narco-political assassin;~.tions. After 
Colosio refused to meet with Humberto Garcia Abrego, brother of the cartel boss, the Gulf 
cartel's leaders were very irritated and Colosio was killed two days after the cartel's 
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invitation. Since Jorge Vera Verdejo, a coordinator for Colosio's campaign routE;s, and Jorge 
Antonio Sanchez Ortega, an advisor to Salinas, were connected to Marcela Bodenstedt, the 
gulf cartel's principal liaison, journalists have linked Colosio's assassination to a narco-
political nexus in the Mexican political system. 
It is uncertain whether the chief of security of Colosio, Romiro Garcia, had ties to 
Emilio Gamboa Patron, the then secretary of Communications and Transport~~tion, and to 
Carlos Salinas. Fernando de la Sota was another member of the security team that was part of 
a secret intelligence group. De la Sota was trained by the CIA to deal with and investigate 
insurgency groups in Mexico. Among the skills he learned in the CIA was h~~w to create 
screens to hide responsibility for assassinations. Some of the theories used in the Colosio 
assassination propose that the assassin Mario Aburto Martinez acted alone. However, this 
theory was discarded after a videotape showed how the people in charge of guarding cleared 
the way so that Aburto Martinez could get close to him. Another theory is that :PRI activists 
from the state of Baja California could have done it, but this seems doubtful as none of them 
were nearby when Colosio was killed. The third theory was that federal or state officials 
acted in association with narcotics interests. This version was the most accepted since narco-
politicians and drug traffickers had a strong interest in ending Colosio's attempt for the 
presidency (Jordan, 1999). 
Ruiz Massieu was assassinated on September 28, 1994, after a meeting; with newly 
elected deputies to Congress. Daniel Aguilar Trevino fired the single shot that killed Ruiz 
Massieu. Since an Uzi weapon was used at the scene crime, it was believed that drug 
traffickers were involved in the assassination. Massieu's brother, Mario Ruiz Massieu, had 
vigorously prosecuted drug traffickers, and it seemed that a possible reason for the murder 
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was a vendetta of these drug traffickers working together with some resentful. politicians. 
Since former deputy of the PRI and President of the Commission of Water Resources of the 
House of Deputies Manuel Munoz Rocha disappeared after the crime was committed, he was 
linked to the assassination. Munoz Rocha also was closely associated with (~arlos Hank 
Gonzales and belonged to his political group. Mario Ruiz Massieu also stated that Munoz 
Rocha did not act alone and the investigation pointed also to Raul Salinas, President Salinas 
brother. However, as the investigation led to the names of some politicians, Mario Ruiz 
Massieu received orders from the presidency to slow down the investigation and to stop 
talking to the press without the express approval of the president's public rela~cions officer. 
After saying that he (Mario Ruiz) no longer believed that there was conspiracy involved in 
his brother's murder, he then fled to the United States where was detained for accepting 
money from one of the main Mexican drug dealers and for depositing the cash pay-off in a 
Texas bank account. Months later Raul Salinas was arrested for arranging the assassination 
of Ruiz Massieu. During the course of their investigation, Salinas prosecutors exposed some 
surprising financial dealings. The magnitude of these dealings led to another charge of 
corruption on the grounds of "inexplicable enrichment". Mexican prosecutors found $120 
million in foreign bank accounts in addition to savings in real estate and ol:her valuable 
resources. Investigators also came across clandestine accounts in the name of Raul Salinas in 
Switzerland and the Cayman Islands and estimated the Salinas total fortune at more than 
$300 million (Jordan, 1999). 
The evidence of common interests among the drug cartels and the Mexican 
government during the Salinas administration appeared to be valid. Raul Salinas was charged 
with various crimes in which he was linked to organized crime and which suggested an 
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obvious connection between illegal interests and the highest groups of power• in Mexico 
(Curzio, 2000). 
The relocation of the PRI in some regions had accelerated the dismantling of the 
apparatus for mediation between those in political power and the traffickers. The 
assassinations of Posadas, Colosio and Massieu were conclusive events that showed that the 
governing class had broken its own rules and that "hunting season" had begun (Astorga, 
2000). 
In the history of the corruption in Mexico, it is evident that the country's present and 
past leaders have connected with and facilitated the domestic and world wide drug trafficking 
cartels. It is not a surprise that a ruling elite alliance between Mexico's leaders and the mafia 
would have the complete power to assassinate a presidential candidate. Also a ruling elite 
and mafia coalition would with no trouble possess all the power necessary to stop the country 
from revealing the true instigators of the acts of crime (Jordan, 1999). 
